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ABSTRACT
Privacy Preserving Data Collection Framework For User
Centric Network Applications
Advances in mobile and ubiquitous computing increased the number of user
centric applications that comes into all aspects of our lives. This situation has
started to threaten our privacy and created a huge demand for development of
privacy-aware applications. Comprehensive privacy protection mechanisms have
to take all phases of data processing into considerations including data collection
from users, storage of data in central servers, and sharing them with third parties.
However, privacy studies in the literature generally bring solutions for sharing of
collected information with third parties.
In this thesis, a privacy preserving data collection framework is proposed for
user centric network applications. Framework provides privacy of data en route to
data collector(s). We propose a generic bottom-up clustering method that utilizes
k-anonymity or l-diversity concepts during anonymization. Entropy based metrics
for information loss and anonymity level are defined and used in performance eval-
uations. Framework is adapted for networks having different data collector parties
with different privacy levels.
Our framework is applied for two types of data collection applications: (i) privacy
preserving data collection in wireless sensor networks, (ii) preservation of organiza-
tional privacy during collection of intrusion detection logs from different organiza-
tions.
Traditional data utility vs. privacy trade-off has one more dimension in wireless
sensor networks. This dimension is minimization of bandwidth or energy consump-
tion due to the limitations of tiny sensor nodes. Our analyses show that the pro-
posed framework presents a suitable trade-off mechanism among energy consump-
tion minimization, data utility and privacy preservation in wireless sensor network
applications with one or multiple sinks.
It is also demonstrated that our framework brings effective solution for preserving
organizational privacy during sharing of intrusion detection logs among organiza-
tions and central security monitoring entity.
v
O¨zet
Gu¨nu¨mu¨z Kullanıcı Eksenli Ag˘ Uygulamaları ic¸in Kis¸isel
Gizlilig˘i Sag˘layan Bilgi Toplama Anac¸atısı
Mobil ve yaygın bilis¸imdeki ilerlemeler, hayatımızın her alanına giren kullanıcı
bazlı uygulamaların sayısını artırmıs¸tır. Bu durum kis¸isel gizlilig˘imizi tehdit etmekte
ve kis¸isel gizlilig˘e duyarlı uygulamaların gelis¸tirilmesi konusunda bu¨yu¨k bir talep
olus¸turmaktadır. Kapsayıcı kis¸isel gizlilig˘i koruyucu mekanizmaların data is¸lemenin
tu¨m fazlarını kullanıcılardan datanın toplanması, datanın merkezi sunucularda ko-
runması ve u¨c¸u¨ncu¨l s¸ahıslarla paylas¸ılmasını da kapsayacak s¸ekilde go¨z o¨nu¨ne alması
gerekmektedir. Bununla birlikte literatu¨rdeki kis¸isel gizlilik c¸alıs¸maları c¸og˘unlukla
toplanmıs¸ bilginin u¨c¸u¨ncu¨l s¸ahıslarla paylas¸ılması konusunda c¸o¨zu¨mler getirmis¸tir.
Bu tezde, kis¸isel gizlilig˘i sag˘lanmıs¸ bir data toplama anac¸atısı o¨nerilmis¸tir. O¨nerilen
anac¸atı, kis¸isel gizlilig˘i data toplayıcıya giderken sag˘lamaktadır. Anonimles¸tirme
sırasında k-anonimlik ve l-farklılık konseptlerini kullanan genel bir as¸ag˘ıdan yukarıya
ku¨mele metodu o¨nerilmis¸tir. Performans deg˘erlendirmelerinde, entropi bazlı bilgi
kaybı ve anonimlik seviyesi belirleme metrikleri kullanılmıs¸tır. Anac¸atımız, birden
fazla her biri farklı kis¸isel gizlilik seviyelerine sahip olan data toplayıcılarına sahip
ag˘lar ic¸in de uyarlanmıs¸tır.
Anac¸atımız, iki c¸es¸it data toplama uygulamasında denenmis¸tir: (i) kablosuz
senso¨r ag˘larında kis¸isel gizlilig˘i sag˘lanmıs¸ data toplanması, (ii) farklı organizasy-
onlardan saldırı tespit kayıtlarının toplanması sırasında organizasyonel gizlilig˘in
sag˘lanması.
Kablosuz senso¨r ag˘larında geleneksel kis¸isel gizlilik & data yararlılıg˘ı ikilemine
ek olarak bir boyut daha vardır. Bu boyut, ku¨c¸u¨k senso¨r du¨g˘u¨mlerinin sınırlamaları
nedeniyle band genis¸lig˘i ve enerjinin minimize edilmesi gereklilig˘idir. Analizlerimiz
go¨stermektedir ki o¨nerilen anac¸atı, bir ya da birden c¸ok data toplama merkezi ic¸eren
kablosuz senso¨r ag˘larında enerji tu¨ketiminin minimize edilmesi, data yararlılıg˘ı ve
kis¸isel gizlilig˘in sag˘lanması arasında uygun bir denge mekanizması olus¸turmaktadır.
Anac¸atımızın, organizasyonlarla merkezi gu¨venlik izleme birimi arasında organi-
zasyonel gizlilig˘i sag˘layacak s¸ekilde saldırı tespit kayıtlarının paylas¸ılması ic¸in etkin
bir mekanizma olus¸turdug˘u da go¨sterilmis¸tir.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We are living in a data-centric world due to enormous improvement in information
system technologies. Personal data is created, transmitted, processed and stored
very easily. Our daily lives get easier and more safer because of this dynamic nature
of data, thanks to developed information systems. We can watch our homes by
using cameras and Internet even we are very far away from our homes. Patients
can be tracked by health monitoring systems while they are outside of the hospital.
Public and private watchdog agencies implementing many security surveillance ap-
plications in order to prevent or detect malicious activities in living areas. We can
get information from traffic monitoring applications for choosing most convenient
route in crowded cities. Smart grid applications collect details of electricity con-
sumptions of homes in order to minimize energy consumption and lower the cost of
electricity distribution infrastructure. The list of all these applications can be easily
extended.
Rapid proliferation of mobile computing devices such as PDAs, and smartphones
have made huge contributions to data-centric world in terms of data access. Im-
provements in sensor technology facilitated data collection enormously. Data com-
munications have been facilitated with the advent of wireless technologies, like WiFi,
ad hoc or mesh networks. Database system gets more scalable and robust. Data
storage and data processing capabilities have been efficiently improved. All these
technological improvements enable us to deal with huge amount of data mostly over
the environment which is generally un-controlled.
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These benefits of advancements in information technologies lead to a very major
problem: violation of privacy. Privacy is described as ability of an individual or
group to decide which information about themselves would seclude or which infor-
mation would revealed to whom. However, in such a data-centric world, information
owners, in most of the time, cannot control flow of their personal data. Control-
ling requires putting some restrictions on data during creation, transmission and
storage stages of data life-cycle. These restrictions are applied by privacy preserva-
tion mechanisms embedded in information systems. Preservation mechanisms are
generally motivated and required by laws or other regulations like HIPAA (Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) [1]. Since individuals cannot protect
their privacy by themselves, governments try to help individuals by regulations.
Many countries promote and protect individual privacy by different acts.
Technically, privacy preservation mechanisms have to solve critical problems.
First problem is privacy needs of individuals have to be determined according to well
defined privacy criteria. These criteria have to be quantified by measurable privacy
metrics. Second problem is that privacy preservation mechanisms have to solve
trade-off between data utility and privacy. Privacy preservation imposes restrictions
on data itself or mechanisms restrict creation, transmitting and storage of personal
data, which means data utility is degraded to some extent. Preservation methods
have to discriminate personal data from other data, fulfill all privacy requirements
and, at the same time, they have to maximize data utility.
First responsibility of a privacy preservation mechanism is to collect data from
individuals according to required privacy criteria. The second responsibility is to
protect personal data against security threats of environment. This responsibility
may include using appropriate encryption and access control mechanisms, perform-
ing procedural security countermeasures, providing physical security of environment,
hardening information systems against remote and local hacking activities. In this
thesis, we concentrate on privacy preserving data collection mechanisms.
2
Privacy Preserving Data Collection Models:
Studies on privacy problem mostly concentrated on achieving collection and
sharing of data under the required privacy constraints in order to make efficient
knowledge-based decisions. Data collection refers to conveying of user data from
data owners to a central data collector. In some situations, data collector may share
this data with other third parties. Data collection is modelled according to the trust
level between data owner and data collector party. These models are categorized
into two categories, trusted data collection model [2] and un-trusted data collection
model [3].
In trusted data collection model, [2] as shown in Figure 1.1, data is collected from
data owners by data collector party named as data publisher. Data publisher shares
data with data recipient who will actually use it for performing a required data
analysis task. Here, data collection and data sharing are separate operations. A
generic example is the application where hospitals share medical records with medi-
cal research institutions. In this example, data owners are patients, data publishers
are hospitals and data recipients are medical research institutions. Data publishers
collect all the details of records of data owners (R1, R2, · · ·Rn) but they are required
to share privacy preserved data with data recipients. Data owners do not trust
data recipient parties; however, they are required to fully trust data publishers in
completing privacy preserving operations. Also data owners have to be sure that
their data is not maliciously or unintentionally used for illegal duties by staff of data
publishers.
An intrinsic assumption of this model is that data publisher does not know the
details of analysis or data mining tasks which will be performed by data recipient.
This may be due to situation that data publisher has lack of technical expertise in
the corresponding analysis methods or data publisher does not even know what type
of analysis will be done on shared data in data recipient part. According to this
model, without detailed considerations about data analysis methods, data publisher
shares information with data recipient as much as possible. However, criteria which
3
Figure 1.1: Trusted Data Collection Model
will fulfill the privacy needs of data owners have to be devised and they have to be
obeyed during data sharing.
In un-trusted data collection model as shown in Figure 1.2, data owners send
their records to data collector but they do not trust it. Data collection and data
sharing do not occur separately as in trusted model. Privacy preservation has to be
done at the data owner side and privacy preserved data (R
′
1, R
′
2, · · ·R′n) are collected
by data collectors. Data is perturbed so that data collector cannot deduce records
of individuals but the same data analysis results are reached by data collector. In
this model, queries or data analysis methods those are used by data collector have
to be known in advance. Therefore, these solutions are required to fix and restrict
the type of analysis or mining tasks at the data collector side which may not be
possible in most of the time.
Privacy Preservation Techniques
As a privacy preserving operation, data collector can mainly use two main tech-
niques: (i) privacy preserved data publishing [2], (ii) privacy preserved data mining
4
Figure 1.2: Un-trusted Data Collection Model
techniques [4]. Privacy preserved data mining techniques perturb the original data so
that application of these techniques to perturbed data will result the same accurate
mining results. However, data collector have no possibility to obtain original data
which may violate the privacy of data owners. Some attributes of data records may
be modified with false data, the attribute values of may be swapped among different
records or totally new artificially created records can be inserted to original data
sets at the data owner side. Un-trusted data collection model uses privacy preserved
data mining techniques. Also in trusted data collection model, data publishers can
benefit from these techniques before sharing the data with data recipients. However
in practice data publishers do not know the details of data analysis tasks which
will be performed by data recipients. For example, Californian hospitals have to
publish patient records on the Web due to regulations [5] without exactly knowing
the analysis types.
Privacy preserved data publishing techniques do not change the truthfulness of
data at record level and try to collect information as much as possible. These tech-
niques assert privacy criteria which can be applied to a collection of records. There-
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fore, they need to collect a set of records at a trusted party for privacy preservation
operations. Trusted data collection model applies these techniques. k-Anonymity
is introduced as a basic privacy method in privacy preserved data publishing [6].
This method is based on the fact that privacy problem cannot easily be solved
by just stripping of identity information (name, surname, social security number
etc) from the record of data owner. Some other data fields called quasi-identifiers
may be used to identify a person by using external information sources. This at-
tack technique is called“Re-identification attac” [6] or “record linkage attack” [2].
For example in a hospital database, address, sex or other attributes can identify
exactly a person. k-Anonymity generalizes or suppresses quasi-identifiers of data
records so that any individual cannot be differentiated between other records of
k − 1 individuals by using those quasi-identifiers. k-anonymity solutions solve the
prevention of “record linkage attack” which is actually finding the owner of a record
through quasi-identifier attributes. However, it is shown that without finding the
exact owner of a record, if sensitive attribute exists in a record (like health status
of a patient), it may be possible to identify sensitive attribute of an individual in
some circumstances by an attack called “attribute linkage attack” [2]. k-Anonymity
is extended by l -diversity, p-sensitivity and t-closeness notions in order to prevent
attribute linkage attack [7–9].
1.1 Motivation
Existing studies approach to the privacy problem in the context of the discussed
trusted and un-trusted models. There is an intrinsic mapping between privacy
models and privacy methods so that trusted model uses privacy preserved data
publishing methods whereas un-trusted model uses privacy preserved data mining
methods.
In network applications, which collect data from users, determination of analysis
and mining tasks in the network design stage may limit the capability of this data
collection system. Also, the requirements of analysis tasks may change with time.
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Therefore, in most of the time privacy preserved data publishing methods are more
useful in data collection applications. However, data owners may not fully trust
data publisher or data collector party. Any person with malicious intent in the data
collector site may have possibility to reach all the private data. Another possibility
may be that due to inefficiency of security countermeasures at the data collector
site or security problems during data collection operations, attackers can obtain
private data. Data owners generally may want data to be privacy preserved before
reaching these un-trusted parties. Therefore, a new model has to be devised so
that privacy preserved data publishing methods can be applied for un-trusted data
collectors. This thesis provides a model for application of publishing methods in the
environments having these types of data collectors.
It seems that direct solution is performing privacy preserving operations directly
at owner side by stripping off the identity information. However, record linkage or
attribute linkage attacks threaten the privacy of data owners. Privacy preserved data
publishing methods, k-anonymity, l -diversity, etc., prevent against these attacks but
they can be applied where many data of users are collected. They can take place
at somewhere between owner side and data collection party. This place has to be
trusted by the data owners. If this place is chosen as close as possible to user and
privacy preservation is done by automatic applications where any involvement of
a person is not possible, users will be more satisfied about the privacy preserving
mechanism. This criterion also leads system designers to set-up distributed trusted
parties, which means if one trusted party is compromised by attackers, only some
part of the data owners will be affected by this compromise. “Single point of failure”
property of traditional trusted model will change the notion of distributed trusted
parties. A required model for privacy preserved data collection is shown in Figure
1.3. In this model, data owners send their data to local trusted parties. Appropriate
privacy preserving operations are done at these local ones and privacy preserved
data is sent to the data collector, which is un-trusted for users. For example, if
the data collection environment is mobile phone infrastructure, privacy preserving
mechanisms can take place at the local base stations instead of performing them at
7
Figure 1.3: Distributed Trusted Data Collection Model
the central data collection point. Sometimes, designer of collection systems can also
have options to find trusted parties between data owners and data collection centers.
Suppose that a research center collects intrusion logs of organizations over Internet
in order to do intrusion detection research but organizational privacy have to be also
preserved during this collection. Organizations mostly do confidentiality agreements
with their Internet Service Providers (ISPs), therefore ISPs may be trusted parties
for organizations.
Privacy models assume that there is only one collection party in a data collection
application. However, in the existing network applications, applications themselves
may send information to two different collection parties at the same time. For exam-
ple, health-care monitoring applications may send health status of an individual to
hospital or to a relative of that individual at the same time. On the other side, due
to nature of application, information can be captured by third parties such that an
eavesdropper can gather wireless packets in a wireless sensor network (WSN) appli-
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cation. Different data collectors may have different trust levels. A patient can have
a more trust his relative than hospital or eavesdropper is totally an un-trusted party
in a WSN application. Privacy preserving model and methods have to take all the
receiving parties and their different trust levels into consideration. The framework
proposed in this thesis provides a privacy model with one or more data receiving
parties having different levels of privacy.
1.2 Challenges
Privacy preserving operations have to solve a trade-off between data utility and
privacy level of data. Privacy preservation operations remove or modify portions
of data in order to fit to privacy criteria. Privacy preserving methods have to
cause data loss not more than the requirement of criteria but this is not an easy
task. For k-anonymity, Meyerson and Williams [10] showed that k-anonymization
with minimum number of suppressions is NP-hard. Aggarwal et al. showed that
the problem of k-anonymization is NP-hard even when the attribute values are
ternary [11]. Also decisions for the required privacy level have to be done according
to the possible loss in the data utility and tolerance level of application to this
amount of loss.
Requirement of privacy levels may not be fixed during the life-cycle of personal
data. For example, applications like patient monitoring outside hospitals, continu-
ously track spatio-temporal information of patients with their health statuses. In
non-emergency times, users may not want to give full details of time and location
knowledge to hospitals; however, in urgent times, users prefer to maximize the data
utility so that immediate actions are performed by hospitals. Therefore, privacy
levels imposed by applications have to be managed easily.
Most of the network applications have resource constraints so that privacy preser-
vation operations have to take them into account. For example, wireless sensor
network applications have to minimize energy consumption or wireless mesh net-
works have to reduce network bandwith usage at mesh routers and decrease energy
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consumption at client side.
Privacy preserving data publishing methods need trusted parties. Although these
methods cannot avoid the requirement of trusted party existence, additional privacy
and security mechanisms may be developed for the transmission of data from users
to trusted parties and storage of data at trusted party.
1.3 Design Objectives of the Proposed Framework
Proposed privacy preserved data collection framework bases on the property that
data collection party collects as much information as possible in order to have wider
coverage of analysis types. Therefore, our framework brings solution for privacy
preserving data publishing methods like k-anonymity or l -diversity which are aiming
to prevent record linkage or attribute linkage attacks.
Our framework assumes that data collector is not fully trusted party for users.
Also it is designed so that more than one party having different levels of privacy
can collect data at the same time. Privacy model has to be adopted so that privacy
preserving publishing methods will work under these assumptions.
Minimization of energy or minimization of bandwith usage has to be considered
as a major design criteria according to the type of network. Privacy preservation
causes data loss. If preservation operations are done at closer places to users, this
lost data does not need to be transferred unnecessarily in the network which may
increase the resource consumptions. Representation of collected data has to be
chosen such that size of collected data is minimized.
Privacy preservation methods have to maximize the data utility under the re-
quired privacy criteria. Generalization or suppression operations have to be cleverly
done so that data collector party can reach more accurate analysis results. These
operations have to be well adapted to the chosen representation types for collected
data.
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1.4 Contribution
In this thesis, a privacy preserving framework is proposed for applications in which
data is collected from users. A privacy model for data collection is adapted so that
there is no a central trusted data collector party; all privacy preserving operations
are done in distributed trusted parties which are located closer to users. Moreover,
our model assumes that there exists more than one data collector party having
different privacy levels.
Bottom-up clustering idea is adopted as an anonymization method in order to
have multiple privacy levels. Traditionally, suppression and generalization opera-
tions are used for anonymization. Proposed framework uses encryption instead of
suppression for achieving multiple levels of privacy in one anonymous output for
different data collectors. Encrypted data portions can be recovered by the parties
having corresponding keys. Parties having lack of appropriate keys consider these
data portions as suppressed data.
Proposed framework minimizes the data loss of generalization operations by in-
troducing the dynamic taxonomy tree concept. If two different values are generalized
according to static taxonomy trees, attributes are replaced with an attribute in the
common ancestors of these two values. Instead, dynamic taxonomy tree method
sends a set of attribute values instead of more generalized value in order to create
more quality data. However, this may increase the data length in some situations.
Analysis of information loss versus resource consumption trade-off is done in related
parts.
Proposed privacy model and framework are deeply investigated in two differ-
ent network applications. Firstly, they are adopted for wireless sensor networks
(WSNs). For different types of WSN topologies, energy consumption, information
loss and multiple levels of privacy issues are explored under the proposed model and
framework. Secondly, adaptation performed for providing of organizational privacy
in an application that collects intrusion logs from organizations over the Internet in
order to perform collaborative intrusion detection research.
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1.5 Thesis Outline
Outline of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives background informa-
tion about privacy preservation concepts and presents related work in the literature.
Chapter 3 introduces the proposed anonymization method, k-Anonymization Clus-
tering Method. Chapter 4 proposes a k-anonymity based framework for privacy
preserving data collection in WSNs. In Chapter 5, privacy framework is proposed
for preserving organizational privacy in log sharing applications. Chapter 7 con-
cludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background Information and Related Work
Privacy has been studied under the name of “anonymity” for a long time. Anonymity
is defined as subject being not identifiable within a set of subjects [12]. Therefore,
hiding of a subject among other subjects may be a well-defined privacy criteria.
Privacy and anonymity terms are generally used instead of each other. However,
privacy has a more comprehensive meaning.
Privacy or anonymity has been studied in two different information technology
fields, database and network. General road map of related studies differ in both
areas. In network studies, anonymity problem is mostly referred to hiding sender
and/or receiver identities of network messages. On the other side, database commu-
nity has a data-centric approach which targets to hide the owner of a data record or
hide the disclosure of sensitive attributes of a record owner. Database community
started with the notion of k-Anonymity and later has extended it.
In this section, first two subsections, 2.1 and 2.2, give background information
and literature review about sender/receiver anonymity and k-Anonymity, respec-
tively. Subsection 2.3 gives some information about entropy notion as a privacy and
information loss metric. Subsection 2.4 specifically concentrates on privacy studies
about wireless sensor networks. Subsection 2.5 reviews the studies about the privacy
of intrusion and security logs.
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2.1 Sender/Receiver Anonymity
Subjects of anonymity problem are generally chosen as the identities of communi-
cated nodes in various types of networks. Possible sender or receiver nodes consti-
tute the anonymity set. In anonymous system, an outsider could not discriminate
the communicated parties among the members of anonymity set. Therefore, larger
anonymity sets mean more anonymous systems.
An adversary who monitors and/or captures certain parts of the communica-
tion system may want to know the receiver of a message, the sender of a message
or matching pair of sender and receiver in critical communications [12]. Receiver
anonymity prevents the identification of message receiver, sender anonymity pre-
vents finding of message sender and relationship anonymity prohibits the deter-
mination of relationship between sender-receiver pairs. Hiding the relationship is
termed as un-linkability of sender and receiver [13].
In normal network communications, source and destination of messages are em-
bedded in packet headers. Although elimination of this information can be somehow
achieved, various traffic analysis methods [14] can be applied by attackers in order
to obtain discriminative communication patterns and using them for the identifica-
tion of communicating partners. Patterns can be deduced from time and duration
of communication or the length of exchanged data. Providing confidentiality or in-
tegrity for exchanged data cannot prevent the traffic analysis. Real anonymity can
be achieved by providing unobservability property. Unobservability is described as
the state of communication message being indistinguishable from any other messages
at all [13]. This property ensures hiding of all communication patterns.
Sender/receiver anonymity problem in the literature are mainly based on two
theoretic studies; DC-Nets and mixes.
The basic idea of DC-Nets [15] is anonymously broadcasting a message for provid-
ing receiver anonymity. If the message is intended to send to a specific destination,
it is encrypted by the destination’s public key. In addition to public keys, each node
shares a secret key with other participants and use them in anonymously sharing
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data. DC-Nets suffer from many important drawbacks. First of all, it brings so-
lution for only recipient anonymity; sender anonymity is not considered. Second,
performing secret key and public key distribution could be difficult in large net-
works. Third, if two participants send messages at the same time, two messages will
be added at each participant where any participant including actual receiver cannot
receive the message. Therefore, sending one message at a time must be guaranteed
by the system. This drawback can lead to a very effective DoS attack such that
malicious users constantly send messages in order to deliberately spoil the content
of the actual delivered message.
Mixes have got higher attraction among the researchers so that many papers are
published and practical applications are created by using the various versions of the
mix idea. Mixes [16] is an important idea for providing sender-recipient anonymity
and resisting to traffic analysis. Let’s say a sender sends a message to a recipient
through the forwarding nodes f1, f2, f3, ..., fD and all of these nodes are known by the
sender. Firstly sender encrypts the message with the public key of fD, and then con-
sequently with the keys of fD−1, fD−2, ..., f2, f1. Suppose that public key encryption
is denoted by Efx(M) whereM is the plain text and fx is the public key. So sequen-
tial encryption yields the following structure: EfD(EfD−1(EfD−2(..., Ef2(Ef1(M))))))
Each node on the message path, gets the message, decrypts it with its private
key and sends to the next hop. The first node of the path knows the actual sender
and the last node knows the actual receiver. Therefore, the remaining nodes only
have information that they received a message from the previous node and relayed
it to the next hop. Any eavesdropping activity cannot deduce the destination and
source information from the content of the message; however, traffic analysis may
yield valuable information. In order to prevent these attacks, each intermediate
node does not immediately deliver the messages to the next hops and stores until a
predetermined number of other messages are arrived to this node. Then, the node
delivers the messages in random order so that any eavesdroppers cannot correlate
the incoming and outgoing messages and trace the full path. This schema does
not only supply resistance to passive eavesdropping attacks but also it can prevent
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active attacks. Since each forwarding node knows only the previous and the next
hop, attacker does not have the ability of tracing the message unless he captures all
nodes of the path.
Although this schema promises higher security assurance level for passive and
active attacks, it suffers from various practicality issues. First of all, it introduces ad-
ditional latency in each forwarding node. There are different approaches for message
delivery methods which try to balance the trade-off between latency and resistance
to traffic analysis [17, 18]. However, latency remains as an important problem in
acceptably secure systems.
Anonymity problem must be handled in different network types ranging from
the Internet to ad hoc networks. There are various motivations of this problem in
different networks which are described below.
In the Internet, users may not want to reveal their surfing habits like the sites
those they visit, time intervals or duration of their site visitings. Another possibility
is that companies sharing information over Internet may not want to reveal whether
or not any sharing operation has been done with each other.
Web proxies are used in contemporary systems for accelerating the web access
to the Internet. They also provide sender anonymity property to a limited extent.
All users in the internal network constitute the sender anonymity set. Firewalls and
routers also provide similar functionality by network address translation (NAT) tech-
nology. Anonymizer [19] uses a similar proxy model but it is created for providing
anonymity, not for accelerating the web access.
Other than using one proxy, systems called Onion Routing [20] use a series of
proxies which cooperate for sending the web requests. This system is based on the
idea of mixes so that the source chooses the path and the message is multiplicatively
encrypted. Each forwarding node decrypts one layer, gets the next hop information
and relays it. Because of the real time requirements of the applications, onion routers
differ from mix-nets in delaying and reordering the traffic at each node. However,
onion routers can send different types of traffic to each other over a single channel;
therefore, traffic analysis cannot practically be helpful to the attackers in busy onion
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networks.
Crowds [21] is another practical anonymization system. The users of the system
form Crowds users group and the connection request to a web server outside of
this group is directed to a random user inside the group. The new node has two
possibilities: (i) either passing the request to the web server, or (ii) passing it to
another randomly chosen node of crowds group. The request travels within the
group until one of them chooses to send it to the destination web server. Each
transmission is encrypted with the destination’s shared key. Local eavesdroppers,
who can observe all local transmissions in the group, cannot determine the receiver
unless they capture any node along the path or use any traffic analysis methods.
On the other side, the sender of the request is not the actual sender. Thus sender
anonymity is only provided for the eavesdroppers, who can monitor from the outside
of group. This system does not solve the global eavesdropper problems and it does
not take traffic analysis issues into account. Another study, named Hordes [22],
uses the same idea with Crowds except it additionally uses multicast service to
anonymously forward the replies to the sender.
In highly mobile ad hoc networks, new problems may arise like the need for
hinderance of location information and motion patterns of the nodes from malicious
users. Especially in critical military applications, obtaining motion patterns and
locations of mobile clients may be very important for the enemies [23]. In such
a network, motion pattern inference is very easy because of the excessive routing
messages. These messages reveal the location information since node determines
the next hop from its RF coverage area and finding the path of a message makes an
adversary predict the relative distances between each hop. By combining the path
information with the location knowledge of the eavesdropping nodes, near-exact
node positions are found out. Enemy can infer the motion patterns by periodic
examinations of the node locations. Deducing the message path is not a very big
deal in mobile ad hoc networks because of their high routing properties. There
are not any dedicated hosts for routing operation; routing messages are routed by
every host that exists on the message path. In the most common ad hoc routing
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protocols, routing messages are sent in clear text format so that any malicious node
can listen and deduce the full message path. In Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [24]
protocol, all path information is stored in the message. Source, destination and all
other forwarding nodes can be deduced from a single intercepted message. In Ad hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) [25], routing information is
stored in routing tables and it is exchanged whenever needed. Although finding out
of the trace is not trivial as in DSR, this routing method does not totally solve the
problem, because collaborative eavesdroppers can trace the message from source to
destination and learns the message path. Therefore on demand protocols like AODV
fail to achieve location and motion privacy under the assumption that enemy has
unbounded eavesdropping capabilities.
Mobile ad hoc networks can benefit from anonymity solutions in providing mo-
bile privacy. Since every node behaves as a router in these networks, exchange of
routing information occupies considerably important amount of the legitimate traf-
fic. Malicious users can use routing messages for their eavesdropping aims and they
can easily violate mobile privacy and anonymity of the system. First of all, anony-
mous routing protocols must be developed. Then the messages must be sent in this
routing structure anonymously.
ANODR (anonymous on demand routing) [23] protocol is proposed for anony-
mous routing. Tracing an on-demand routing protocol is more complicated than
tracing other ones, but collaborative eavesdroppers can easily track a communica-
tion. ANODR anonymously discovers the route by using the notion of broadcasting
with trapdoor information, which is based on onion routing idea of Mix-net. In
onion routing system, source encrypts the message sequentially by all of the public
keys of nodes on the path starting from the actual destination node to the first node
of path. It is important to note that full onion message is created in the source node
and it is assumed that the source knows the full path. In starting phase of ANODR
protocol, since it is on demand protocol, source does not know the path, protocol
tries to find it by route discovery process. First, source broadcasts route discovery
message to the nodes in its coverage area with a trapdoor function embedded in the
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message. Each node that takes the broadcast message determines if the message
is destined to itself by using this trapdoor function. If a node understands that
the destination is not itself, it encrypts the entire message with its public key and
broadcasts again. Each broadcast operation adds one layer to onion at each node
until the message reaches to the destination. Destination reverses the onion to the
sender after determining that it is destined to itself. After that each hop decrypts
the message by its private key, puts appropriate route pseudonyms and relays the
message to the next hop. After all route pseudonyms are constructed for full path,
route discovery phase is completed and the actual message is ready for sending op-
eration. Receiver anonymity is provided by broadcasting and content correlation is
prevented by onion structure and route pseudonyms.
Privacy studies of network community generally focus on hiding sender or re-
ceiver entities in network communications. However, in data collection applications,
sender or receiver entities are known by all parties. Privacy threat models of data
collection applications concentrate on privacy of collected data rather than hiding
the communicated entities. In this thesis, collected data is considered as the subject
of privacy.
2.2 Basics of k-Anonymity
At first glance, it may be assumed that privacy problem can be easily solved by strip-
ping off the attributes which identify individuals like name, social security number
etc. However, the problem of privacy poses extra challenges that cannot be easily
solved by simple “stripping off” mechanisms. Some other data fields and sources
may be jointly used to deduce some private information. Suppose some organiza-
tions need to share their electronic information, such as public health or demographic
data, with other organizations. However, they want to provide the privacy of their
consumers or personnel during this information sharing operation. Simply strip-
ping off the name or social security number information from the data set does not
solve the privacy problem. It is possible to identify the owner of a record by using
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attributes like birth date, address, sex, ZIP code etc. Government or public orga-
nizations release data in the form of voter lists, telephone or address books, local
census data. Collecting data from these resources and linking them to targeted
released data may enable to identify the individuals. Also some people can collect
data directly observing specific individuals and use their observations and released
data in order to obtain private information of individuals.
Attack method called ‘re-identification attack’ [6] or ‘record linkage attack’ [2]
directly uses these methods. In order to prevent these type of attacks, Samarati
and Sweeney proposed k-anonymity [6]. Basically, k-anonymity brings a specific
restriction to anonymity problem so that it targets to hide one subject among some
other k − 1 subjects. In other words, the attributes those may help to identify
a subject are modified, via k-anonymization, in such a way that each subject has
an anonymity set having a size of at least k − 1. Generally in privacy problems,
owner of the record or individual having the attributes in the record is assumed to
be the subject of anonymity. k-anonymization of data is performed by suppression
or generalization of some parts. Generalization and suppression operations cause
information loss. Thus, it is important to minimize the amount of loss by minimizing
the number of suppression and generalization operations while keeping the data
k-anonymous. It is shown that achieving optimal k-anonymization by minimum
number of suppressions is NP-hard even when the alphabet size of attributes equal
to three [10].
2.2.1 k-Anonymity Definitions
Some basic definitions used used in k-anonymity are explained below:
Quasi-identifier Attribute: Attribute that is not able to identify a subject by
using per se but it may help to identify subject with the combination of similar
attributes. The set of all quasi-identifier attributes of table T is Q.
k-anonymity: Suppose that T (Q) refers to the new table produced by keeping the
quasi-identifier attributes and removing the others in table T . T has k-anonymity
property if and only if each record is indistinguishable from other k − 1 records in
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T (Q). Generalization and suppression are more common techniques to make the
data k-anonymous.
Anonymity Set: If a subject cannot be discriminated from a set of other subjects,
this set is called anonymity set of that subject. In k-anonymity, each subject has
an anonymity set having at least k-1 elements.
Generalization: Generalization operation replaces a quasi-identifier attribute value
by more general value. For example, birth date like ‘04.05.1977’ can be replaced by
‘1977’ in a generalization operation. Numerical attribute values may be generalized
to numeric intervals.
Suppression: Deletion of a quasi-identifier attribute of a record or removing the
entire record.
2.2.2 Taxonomy Trees
Taxonomy tree is a tree structure that is created for each categorical quasi-identifier
attribute to replace existing attribute value with more general one in k-anonymization
process [26–28]. Actually, this replacement is a generalization operation. Leaves of
the tree contain the distinct values of attributes. Nodes in the higher levels of tree
contain more general attribute values. During the anonymization, replacement is
done with the values in the higher levels of the tree. There is a root of the tax-
onomy tree. If the attribute value is generalized up to this point, that means the
attribute value has no information. Suppression is considered as another operation
for anonymization in literature [27], but it is actually a generalization operation
where the attribute value is generalized to the root of attribute’s taxonomy tree.
Let us think that a sensor network collects location information as an address.
A possible taxonomy tree for this location attribute can be constructed as in Figure
2.1. Suppose that k is chosen as 2 and location attribute is the quasi-identifier.
If there are two records having location information for ‘Buket Street’ and ‘Selvi
Street’, and if they are decided to be anonymized to a common value, location
attribute value is generalized to common ancestor in the tree which is actually
‘Istasyon Avenue’. Location attribute values of two records are replaced with this
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Figure 2.1: Static Taxonomy Tree for Location Information
Table 2.1: Attributes of Sample Data
Attribute Name Attribute Type Values of Attribute
Vehicle Type categorical train, truck, bus, pickup, vans, car
Time numerical Values between 00:00 and 24:00
Location categorical Serin Str., Buket Str., Selvi Str.,
Mimoza Str., Durmaz Str.
more general attribute value. Thus, no one can discriminate these two records from
each other by using location information.
2.2.3 k−Anonymity Example
For example, assume that a wireless sensor network is constructed for traffic mon-
itoring. This application collects information about the vehicles passing through
some locations of a city. Attributes of sample data is given in Table 2.1. A sample
set of data is given in Table 2.2. k is chosen as two and data in Table 2.2 is made
2-anonymous. A sample 2-anonymized version of the data by only generalization
operations is shown in Table 2.3. Anonymization operations are completed by using
taxonomy trees for location information and vehicle type which are given in Figure
2.1 and Figure 2.2 respectively.
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Table 2.2: A Sample Data For a Traffic Monitoring Application
Vehicle Type Time Location
car 12:05 Buket Street
train 13:00 Selvi Street
bus 12:50 Serin Street
pickup 11:30 Serin Street
bus 12:30 Durmaz Street
truck 12:20 Selvi Street
Table 2.3: Anonymized Version of the Sample Data
Vehicle Type Time Location
normal sized vehicle 11:30-12:05 Istasyon Avenue
high sized vehicle 12:20-13:00 Selvi Street
bus 12:30-12:50 Tuzla
normal sized vehicle 11:30-12:05 Istasyon Avenue
bus 12:30-12:50 Tuzla
high sized vehicle 12:20-13:00 Selvi Street
Figure 2.2: Static Taxonomy Tree for Vehicle Type
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Table 2.4: A Sample Data Which Requires Prevention of Attribute Linkage
Age Zip Code Disease
18 06100 Viral Infection
55 06330 Cancer
60 06350 Cancer
20 06400 Viral Infection
35 06500 Heart Disease
50 06300 Cancer
2.2.4 k-Anonymity Studies
In [29] and [30], k-anonymity is presented as a formal protection model. Sweeney,
provides a formal presentation of combining generalization and suppression to achieve
k-anonymity in [27]. This study uses generalization hierarchies during the gener-
alization and suppression operations. Domain generalization hierarchies are intro-
duced for categorical attributes and value generalization hierarchies for numeric at-
tributes. Meyerson and Williams [10] showed that k-anonymization with minimum
number of suppressions is NP-hard. Aggarwal et al. [11] showed that the problem
of k-anonymization is NP-hard even when the attribute values are ternary. Some
approximation algorithms are proposed for this problem in [31] and [10]. Greedy
heuristic algorithms are introduced in [26] and [28] in order to produce k-anonymous
data while preserving the property of building decision tree classifiers. Therefore,
privacy of data is guaranteed and it can be used for classification purposes.
2.2.5 Attribute Linkage vs Record Linkage
k-anonymity solutions solve the prevention of “record linkage attack” which is ac-
tually finding the owner of a record through quasi-identifier attributes. However,
it is shown that without finding the exact owner of a record, if sensitive attribute
exists in a record , it may be possible to identify sensitive attribute of an individual
in some circumstances by an attack called “attribute linkage attack” [2].
In Table 2.4, a sample data collected by a hospital is shown. In this data, age
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Table 2.5: 3-Anonymized Version of Sample Data
Age Zip Code Disease
18-35 06*** Viral Infection
18-35 06*** Viral Infection
18-35 06*** Heart Disease
50-60 063** Cancer
50-60 063** Cancer
50-60 063** Cancer
Table 2.6: Anonymization of Sample Data with 2-Diversity
Age Zip Code Disease
18-50 06*** Viral Infection
18-50 06*** Viral Infection
18-50 06*** Cancer
35-60 06*** Heart Disease
35-60 06*** Cancer
35-60 06*** Cancer
and zip code are considered as quasi-identifiers and disease is chosen as a sensitive
attribute. Main aim of privacy preservation is hiding disease information of an
individual. Table 2.5 gives a possible 3-Anonymized version of this data. All the
last three records of this table has sensitive attribute value, ‘cancer’. Therefore,
prevention of record linkage through k -anonymization does not solve the privacy
problem. Sensitive attributes of these records are easily identified in this case. In
order to address this problem l -diversity notion is introduced [7]. l -diversity requires
that sensitive attribute value of a record owner is hidden among l − 1 sensitive
attributes. Table 2.6 shows anonymized data which has 2-diversity property. This
property guarantees that each anonymity set has at least two different sensitive
values.s
In order to prevent attribute linkage, in addition to l -diversity notion, p-sensitivity
and t-closeness notions are proposed [8, 9].
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2.3 Entropy Notion For Quantifying Privacy and
Calculation of Information Loss
In information theory, entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable.
Quantity introduced by entropy measures the content of an information in terms of
bits. Entropy notion of Shannon [32] is the theoretic formulation of entropy which
is widely used in information theory literature.
Practically, Shannon entropy estimates the average number of bits for encoding
strings composed of symbols with different frequency. It introduces lower bounds
for compressing and storing communicated data.
Shannon’s entropy is used in quantifying privacy for a privacy protection system
developed for context aware services [33]. This entropy notion determines the level of
abstraction in location and personal preferences reports collected by context aware
service servers. Shannon entropy is used in improving l -diversity in order to prevent
probabilistic inference attacks [7]. Original l -diversity method guarantees existence
of l distinct sensitive attributes in each anonymity set. However, if frequency of some
sensitive attributes is higher, attacker can conclude that individual has the sensitive
attribute with more frequency. l-diversity notion extended by entropy gives higher
value for evenly distributed sensitive attributes.
A top-down refinement algorithm is proposed in order to perform privacy preserv-
ing data publishing for cluster analysis [34]. Entropy notion is used for measurement
of information loss and anonymity calculation in each refinement stage.
Entropy based anonymity measurement model is proposed for measuring the
privacy level of systems protecting sender anonymity [35]. Measurement model is
applied for mix based e-mail applications, Crowds and Onion Routing.
There exists clustering algorithms which uses information theoretic distance
functions based on Shannon entropy [36] [37] [38].
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2.4 Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks
Anonymity is being not identifiable of a subject within a set of “subjects”. In
networks like Internet and Ad hoc networks, identities of communicated parties are
considered as subjects. Therefore, anonymity studies concentrate on hiding sender
and/or receiver identity information. However, in sensor networks subject is mostly
event information. Event information is sensed and sent to sinks or other central
storage node. Anonymity problem of event information can be dealt in sensing
and sending stages. In the literature, for sensing stage, data aggregation is used
for creating anonymous event data. For communication stage, variations of known
anonymity techniques are applied.
In Gruteser and Grunwald’s study [39], an anonymity solution is proposed for
providing high degree of privacy in location based services. They assert that adver-
sary can get the location information of an individual by different types of attacks
like eavesdropping of whole traffic or compromising the server provider’s system.
They claim that adversary can identify a specific individual by linking the event lo-
cation information with a priori knowledge about the event. If location information
is disseminated continuously for tracking purpose in applications like traffic moni-
toring, fleet management and ‘pay as you drive’ insurance, adversary can track all
movements of an individual. Location and time information of events are cloaked
so that an outsider cannot differentiate any individual among the other k different
individuals. Event messages are sent to anonymity server in which any identifiers
like network addresses are removed, data perturbation is performed and reordering
of the incoming messages from different nodes is accomplished. This study omits
the threat that adversary who captures the traffic between nodes and anonymity
server can do deeper traffic analysis.
Data cloaking and a communication anonymity solution is used together to have
an anonymous system in [40]. Proposed sensor network acts as an in-building occu-
pant movement tracking system in which the main purpose is finding the popularity
level and usage amount of different parts of a large building. The main aim is pro-
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viding privacy through anonymity. Sensor network has a hierarchical structure and
do data cloaking operations on sensed data or sensor node ID information. Data
cloaking is done at the nodes of upper hierarchies. With less spatial accuracy or
data perturbation, they tried to have an anonymous system. In order to prevent
eavesdropping and other active attacks, node communications are encrypted and
authenticated by SPINS like protocols [41]. Prevention of traffic analysis is tried
to be accomplished by periodic message sending independent from sensor readings.
This study presents a solution for data perturbation tolerant applications. How-
ever data perturbation may not be tolerable in many critical applications. On the
other side, adversary can understand whether cloaking of sensor node ID informa-
tion is done and he can find the actual sensor node ID by following the traffic in
hop by hop basis. Therefore, it is not a good solution in environments where global
eavesdropping threat exists.
Data aggregation is also studied by Przydatek, Song and Perrig [42]. In this
study some nodes are chosen as aggregators and they collect data from sensor nodes.
Aggregator node does aggregation operation and proves that the aggregation result
is consistent by random sampling and interactive proof mechanisms. Aggregation is
done for securely finding minimum, maximum and average sensing values.
Ozturk et al. [43] proposed phantom routing method for hiding location infor-
mation of originator sensor node. This routing method is alternative for flooding
type routing algorithms. Threat model bases on the existence of only one adversary
node in the sensor environment. Sensor network tracks moving objects and send
appropriate event information to the sink. Adversary eavesdrops the traffic on this
node and can determine the previous hop of routing messages. Adversary tries to
reach a moving target object. After detecting the previous hop of routing message,
he goes to near of that hop and get closer to the target. He continues this operation
until the target is caught. Proposed routing algorithm aims to make this catch-
ing operation difficult by hiding the location of sensor node. Although the study
presents a good solution to the problem, threat model consists of weak assumptions
that there exists only one adversary node in the system. It does not assume the
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existence of global eavesdropper threat.
Wadaa et al. [44] studied on providing anonymity of coordinate system, cluster
and routing structures during the network setup phase of a wireless sensor network.
The study is lack of formal methods those prove the provided anonymity level and
there is no experimental results showing the effectiveness of the proposed system.
Also the proposed solution is restricted to the network setup phase.
Castelluccia et al. [45] proposed homomorphic encryption method that securely
aggregates sensor findings in an energy efficient way. This work deals with the aggre-
gation functions, which compute average or variance of sensor findings. Protection
of location privacy is guaranteed by k-anonymity in location based services those
are given on mobile networks [46]. In this work, each mobile client specifies a mini-
mum level of anonymity and maximum temporal and spatial tolerances. Proposed
methods try to provide the needed anonymity level within these quality of service
parameters.
2.5 Privacy in Sharing of Security Logs
Some organizations implement intrusion log collection systems for determination
of general security level of the Internet. They aim to provide early warning sys-
tems about security threats. Deepsight Threat Management System [47], which
is managed by Symantec, gives information to its customers about the emerging
threats, vulnerabilities, risks, workarounds and other references. This system col-
lects logs from intrusion detection systems, virus scanners and firewalls. System
does not use any anonymization method during data collection. Data is not shared
with the research community; it is used for commercial purposes. Internet storm
center, which is implemented by SANS [48], is volunteered and non-commercial
version of DeepSight. It collects intrusion detection system and firewall logs from
volunteer organizations and produces general analysis results for public and cre-
ates customized warning information for organizations. Internet storm center uses
Dshield distributed detection system for data collection and analysis. The imple-
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menters state that they remove the identifying parts of intrusion data by masking
destination IP of logs. However, this anonymization cannot guarantee to prevent
the attack types those are similar to re-identification attacks proposed in privacy
preserving data publishing area [6].
There exist studies about anonymizing IP address of network logs. Actual IP ad-
dresses are replaced by a randomly selected IP addresses according to a permutation
function. New random IP addresses do not contain even the sub-net information.
Entity who captures randomized IP addresses can only deduce that the logs having
the same IP addresses are actually originated from the same host.
Truncation is another anonymization method that converts fixed number of least
significant bits of IP address to zero. This means, the remaining information can
show only subnet or network class information of IP addresses. From anonymized
data, anyone can deduce the subnet information but cannot determine whether logs
belonging to a particular subnet are originated from the same host or from many
hosts.
In prefix-preserving pseudonymization, which is adapted in TCPdriv [49], IP
addresses are mapped to pseudorandom anonymized IP addresses by an anonymiza-
tion function that uses common tables. If first k-bits of original IP addresses are
common, function produces anonymized outputs which are also common in terms of
first k-bits. Xu. et al. [50] proposed a prefix-preserving pseudonymization method,
Crypto-PAn that works consistently in multiple traces by using a shared key. This
study also includes the security evaluation of prefix-preserving pseudonymization
schema. Slagell et al. [51] re-implemented Crypto-PAn in Java for anonymization
of Netflow logs. Netflow logs are logs of network traffic generated by routers. These
logs have a standard log format. Slagell et al. also embedded their own key generator
to their implementation.
Zhang et al. [52] studied on the anonymization of all fields of Netflow and syslog
data for sharing them with managed security service providers. Syslog is s standard
log format used by Unix or Linux based systems. This study gives brief information
about the known anonymization techniques, which can be used for anonymization of
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IP addresses, time information and port numbers. Time information is anonymized
by random time shift method . In this shifting method, the time of log is changed
with random number, but the relative time intervals between related logs are pre-
served. Common public port numbers remain in the logs, however sensitive ports
of sensitive hosts are anonymized.
Studies about privacy preserved security logging generally focus on changing
the truthfulness of log attributes by pseudonymization or by other anonymization
techniques at record level. These techniques may help to do some basic searching
activities or may help to perform some limited types of analysis on privacy preserved
logs. However, the idea of privacy preserving data publishing has not been adapted
to this field. Intrusion log collection systems like DeepSight or Internet Storm
Center need logs with higher data utility. Chapter 5 of this thesis adapts privacy
preserving data publishing techniques to intrusion log collection systems. Proposed
method collects data, which have higher data utility, while preserving privacy of log
owners.
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Chapter 3
Proposed k-Anonymization Clustering Method(k-ACM)
Solving the k-anonymity problem is proved as an NP-Hard [10,11], therefore various
heuristic methods have been developed to minimize data loss as much as possible [6,
28]. In this thesis, we proposed a framework based on the k-anonymization method,
k-ACM, that solves the k-anonymity problem by a bottom-up hierarchical clustering
algorithm. The basic clustering notion is derived from UPGMA (Unweighted Pair
Group Method with Arithmetic Mean) [53].
UPGMA is based on the idea of iteratively joining two closest clusters until one
cluster is left. A suitable distance definition has to be done to measure the distance
between any two clusters. All the distances between each pair of clusters, which are
computed according to the distance definition, are stored in a distance matrix at each
iteration. At the beginning each input vector considered as an individual cluster.
Closest two clusters are found and combined into one common cluster. Distances of
newly formed cluster to the other clusters are recalculated and distance matrix is
updated. The same work continues until one cluster is formed.
k-ACM is applied to the data portion containing only the quasi-identifier at-
tributes. The basic idea is to partition the data vectors into clusters where each
cluster has at least k vectors. After the clustering, vectors in one cluster are
anonymized to a common vector, named representative vector which is actually the
k-anonymization output of all vectors in that cluster. All quasi-identifier attributes
of the input data is replaced by the corresponding attributes of the representative
vector. The clustering process ensures that similar vectors are grouped in clusters
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so that their anonymization does not cause a significant data loss.
Running time of k-ACM is found as O(n2log(n)) where n is the number of event
records. The details about the derivation of running time is given in Section 3.8.
In the later chapters of thesis, it is shown that k-ACM presents an efficient
baseline in anonymizing data for multiple receivers having different privacy levels.
Distance function of clustering process has to be formed in order to reach to
efficient adaptation of clustering idea to the problem. In k-ACM, cluster decisions
are made according to the amount of information loss occurred during cluster com-
binations. Distance function used in k-ACM calculates information loss by using
entropy notion.
In order to choose the appropriate value of parameter k, information loss and
the anonymity level of data have to be quantified. By appropriate quantification
methods, trade-off analysis between data utility and privacy level can be made
efficiently. In this thesis, entropy based quantification methods are proposed for
these two metrics.
In this chapter, first four sections cover the baselines of k -ACM. Section 3.1 ex-
plains the proposed dynamic taxonomy tree idea for generalization methods. Section
3.2 introduces the information loss metric that is used in evaluating k-ACM results.
Section 3.3 presents the distance function used in the proposed method. Section
3.4 proposes entropy based anonymity measurement method. Section 3.5 gives the
proposed algorithm k-ACM. Complexity analysis of k -ACM is given in Section 3.8.
The notation used in this chapter is given in Table 3.1.
3.1 Generalization Method With Dynamic Tax-
onomy Tree
In privacy preserved data collection, the main aim is to share as much as possible
with the related parties under the required privacy criterion. Data collection meth-
ods generally use static taxonomy trees. Over-generalization is a potential problem
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Table 3.1: Notation Table For k-ACM
Notation Explanation Notation
Iteration Number h
Input data T
ith record of input data, T Ti
Array of clusters at the hth iteration Lh
sth cluster in Lh where {s : 0 < s < Lh} Lhs
Total number of clusters at the hth iteration |Lh|
The array of input vectors belonging to cluster Lhs V
h
s
kth bit string of jth input vector of array V hs V
h
s [j][k]
Number of input vectors of cluster (size of cluster),Lhs |V hs |
Representative vector of cluster Lhs in bit string R
h
s
ith bit string of representative vector, Rhs R
h
s [i]
Number of true bits of bit string, x F (x)
Bit string generation function which gets two bit strings,
x and y and produces the generalization of these strings G(x, y)
Distance matrix at the hth iteration Dh
Distance value between sth and tth cluster at the hth iteration Dh[s][t]
Information loss occurred during the formation of cluster, Lhu
(Suppose that sth and tth clusters are combined, form the cluster u) Ihu (I
h
u = D
h[s][t])
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Table 3.2: Anonymized Version of the Sample Data
Vehicle Type Time Location
car-pickup 11:30-12:05 Buket Street - Serin Street
train-truck 12:20-13:00 Selvi Street
bus 12:30-12:50 Serin Street - Durmaz Street
car-pickup 11:30-12:05 Buket Street - Serin Street
bus 12:30-12:50 Serin Street - Durmaz Street
train-truck 12:20-13:00 Selvi Street
of using static taxonomy tree in generalization of categorical attributes. For exam-
ple, in the static taxonomy tree given in Figure 2.1, generalization of ‘Buket Street’
and ‘Selvi street’ values yields to ‘Istasyon Avenue’ value. However, this causes in-
formation loss since records having Istasyon Avenue may also include ‘Serin Street’.
In order to solve this over-generalization problem as much as possible, we propose
to use dynamic taxonomy tree instead of static one. In the proposed dynamic tax-
onomy tree model, the tree is dynamically updated by creating new internal nodes
(i.e. attribute values) during generalization and in on-demand manner depending
on the nature of data and the required generalization. In this method, a new node
is generated when the existing parent node has child(ren) other than the generalized
nodes. The newly generated node covers the attribute values of the generalized ones
only. In this way, generalization is performed with minimum information loss. Let
us continue with the previous example. As shown in Figure 3.1, in our dynamic
approach generalization of ‘Buket Street’ and ‘Selvi Street’ causes a new categorical
value with name ‘Buket Street- Selvi Street’ to be generated instead of generalizing
to existing ‘Istasyon Avenue’. This new value means the attribute is either ‘Buket
Street’ or ‘Selvi Street’, but not ‘Serin Street’.
For example, if we applied dynamic taxonomy tree method to the sample data
given in Table 2.2, 2-anonymized output in Table 3.2 is obtained. From this
anonymized data, the number of vehicles in each street and the number of total
vehicles in each type can be calculated accurately. These calculations cannot be
accurately done from the anonymized data in Table 2.3.
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Figure 3.1: A Sample Node Addition in Dynamic Taxonomy Tree
In order to perform generalization among any of the attribute values using the
proposed dynamic taxonomy tree concept, a flexible data structure should be em-
ployed to represent the attribute values. In our method, a bit string is employed as
this data structure. If an attribute is categorical, the size of the bit string is equal
to the total number of elements in the set of attribute values. In this structure, each
bit corresponds to a distinct attribute value. In order to specify which value that
attribute has, the corresponding bit of the attribute value is set to one, while the
other bits are zero. Bit strings of original data (i.e. data before generalization) has
a single ‘1’ bit.
In this data structure, generalizations are implemented by setting the corre-
sponding bits of the attribute values that will be generalized to ‘1’. Therefore, the
total number of bits having value ‘1’ increases as generalizations occur. Bit string
having many bits having value ‘1’ actually represents an internal node.
For a numerical attribute, range of the attribute can be divided into intervals
where each interval has suitable equal range size. The size of numerical attribute’s
bit string is set to number of intervals. Each interval corresponds to a distinct bit
and if an attributes belongs to an interval, corresponding bit of the interval is set
to one in the bit string. The number of intervals can be determined according to
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the accuracy need for that attribute. More accuracy need means more number of
intervals. Increase in the number of intervals enlarges the sizes of messages, so the
needed transmission energy. Therefore a balance between energy and accuracy must
be constructed in choosing the number of intervals.
Suppose input data is a table T having m attributes, n records. Tij, represents
the j’th attribute of the i’th record where, {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and {j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} .
Table T is represented by a set of bit strings B, where Bij is bit string representation
of j’th attribute of i’th record. k’th bit of Bij is shown as Bij(k). Suppose that
j’th attribute of table is categorical and there are dj distinct values. These values
are indexed by k and shown as Vj(k)where {k : 1 ≤ k ≤ dj}. Bit string of this
categorical attribute has a size of dj and formed as follows:
If Tij = Vj(k) then Bij(k) = 1 else Bij(k) = 0 as ∀k : 0 ≤ k ≤ dj,
If attribute is numerical, the range of attribute is divided into equal-sized inter-
vals. Assume that j’th attribute is numeric and attribute range is divided into ej
number of intervals. Each interval is indexed by k. Bit string representation of this
numeric attribute has a size of ej and formed as follows:
If Tij intersects with k
′th interval, then Bij(k) = 1 else Bij(k) = 0 as ∀k :
0 ≤ k ≤ ej
In our proposed model, anonymizing entries convert quasi-identifier attributes of
data to bit strings and k-ACMmakes them k-anonymous. Through the k-anonymization
process of an attribute, k-ACM uses the notion of dynamic taxonomy tree. During
the formation of dynamic taxonomy tree, bit string of the newly created internal
node of a dynamic taxonomy tree is found by the logical OR operation of bit strings
of all child nodes.
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Table 3.3: A Sample Bit String Representation Set
Records Bi1 Bi2 Bi3
T1 00010 01000 10000
T2 01100 11100 01111
Table 3.4: A Sample Normalized Version of Bit String Representation Set
Records Bi1 Bi2 Bi3
T1 00010 01000 10000
T2 0
1
2
1
2
00 1
3
1
3
1
3
00 01
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
3.2 Information Loss Metric
Calculating the data loss of k-anonymous data is needed to predict the performance
of our proposed method under different k-anonymity parameters. In our study, we
use the entropy concept of information theory to measure the information loss [37].
The difference of entropies between the k-anonymous data and the original data
constitutes the information loss. Suppose that T is the input data set having n
records and m attributes, B is the bit string representation of this data set as
discussed in Section 3.1 and C is the random variable that gets the probability
value of an attribute value in a k-anonymous data entry being the actual attribute
value in the original data. Assume that all the entries of B is normalized according
to the number of bits having value ‘1’ in that entry (from now on we refer “true
bit” to a bit having value ‘1’) and normalized version forms data set B. A sample
data set is shown in Table 3.3. Here, there are two records; each record has three
attributes; each attribute is categorical and each has five distinct attribute values.
Table 3.4 shows the normalized version of data. During normalization, each entry
is divided by the number of true bits in the corresponding bit string entry.
Information loss of a data table T , IL(T ), is equal to the conditional entropy,
H(C | B). Here, conditional entropy gives the uncertainty about the prediction of
the original attribute values of a record when we have the knowledge of corresponding
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k-anonymous bit strings of that record. Original data has only one true bit in
each bit string because each original data entry corresponds to one attribute value.
However, in k-anonymous data, each entry may have more than one attribute value
and each attribute value is represented by an additional bit. Therefore, if an entry
has only one true bit, that entry does not have information loss. In this situation,
we have no doubt that this true bit is the true bit that comes from the original
data. As the number of true bits increases, disorder of the data increases because
it is harder to predict which one of them is the original true bit. Prediction gets
harder because information is lost due to the increase in the number of true bits.
Conditional entropy, which is used in order to calculate the disorder of the data, is
a well measurement tool for the information loss. Conditional entropy H(C | B),
which is equal to information loss of table T , IL(T ), can be found as follows:
IL(T ) = H(C | B) =
∑
Bij∈B
p(Bij)H(C | B = Bij). (3.1)
IL(T ) = −
∑
Bij∈B
p(Bij)
∑
k∈{1..z}
p(C = k | Bij) log p(C = k | Bij). (3.2)
In Equation 3.2, it is assumed that each attribute is converted to bit strings
having size z. This means all categorical attributes have z distinct attribute values
and all numerical attributes have z number of interval ranges. Also, it is assumed
that all k’s, where the equalities of p(C = k | Bij) = 0 are true, are excluded from
the summation. C random variable can take values from the set {1..z}. Actually,
B is calculated for finding the value of this random variable.
p(C = k | B = Bij) = Bij(k) for each k : 1 ≤ k ≤ z. (3.3)
In Equation 3.2, it is assumed that each record has equal probability to be chosen and
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each attribute of record has the same probability, therefore probability mass function
of j’th attribute of i’th record, p(Bij), is calculated as p(Bij) =
1
m.n
. Equation 3.2
can be rewritten as follows:
IL(T ) = H(C | B) = −
∑
Bij∈B
1
m.n
∑
k∈1..z
Bij(k). logBij(k). (3.4)
Suppose that F is the array that contains the number of true bits of the bit string
array B. Total number of true bits in Bij is Fij. Total number of elements in Bij(k)
that has the value of 1
Fij
is equal to Fij, and the rest is zero. Therefore, the second
sum operation of Equation 3.4 yields the value, log 1
Fij
. The simplest equation for
the information loss of data table T , IL(T ), can be calculated as follows :
IL(T ) = H(C | B) = −
∑
Fij∈F
1
m.n
log
1
Fij
=
1
m.n
∑
Fij∈F
logFij. (3.5)
3.3 Distance Calculation
The aim of our method is minimizing the information loss while providing the re-
quired level of k-anonymity. At each iteration of k -ACM, two clusters are combined.
Each cluster combination leads to some generalization operations and therefore to
information loss. k-ACM has to choose the most suitable cluster pair, which creates
minimum information loss when they are combined. To do so, a suitable distance
calculation method is needed. In Section 3.2, conditional entropy notion is used
in calculating the overall information loss of k-anonymized data. This notion is
adapted in calculating the distance between any two clusters such that distance
between any two clusters is the entropy loss caused by merging them.
At the hth iteration the distance between sth and tth clusters is defined asDh[s][t].
Suppose that resulting cluster after merging of clusters s and t is represented as
cluster u in iteration h + 1. Cluster u has |V hs + V ht | number of elements. Merging
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operation means that |V hs | number of input vectors having value Rhs and |V ht | number
of input vectors having value Rht is converted to |V hs +V ht | number of vectors having
value Rh+1u . Conditional entropy value before merging operation is represented as
Ehst and computed by the help of Equation 3.5 as follows:
Ehst =
1
m.(|V hs |+ |V ht |)
|V hs |
∑
i∈{1..m}
log(F (Rhs [i])) + |V ht |
∑
i∈{1..m}
log(F (Rht [i])). (3.6)
Eh+1u is the conditional entropy value after merging operation and calculated as
follows:
Eh+1u =
1
m.(|V hs |+ |V ht |)
(|V hs |+ |V ht |)
∑
i∈{1..m}
log(F (Rh+1u [i])). (3.7)
Eh+1u =
1
m
∑
i∈{1..m}
log(F (Rh+1u [i])). (3.8)
Distance between cluster s and t at iteration h, Dh[s][t], is calculated as follows:
Dh[s][t] = Eh+1u − Ehst. (3.9)
3.4 Anonymity Measurement
k-anonymity guarantees a certain level of anonymity because it ensures that each
subject cannot be differentiated at least among other k − 1 subjects. In this part,
we calculate the amount of anonymity provided by k-ACM.
Suppose that A and B are the sets of records in original data and k-anonymous
data respectively. Conditional entropy, H(A | B), is used as anonymity measure-
ment method. H(A | B) gives the uncertainty level of prediction of the record in A
when the corresponding anonymous version of the record in B is known. Here, more
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uncertainty means high anonymity level. The amount of anonymity, Q, is calculated
as follows:
Q = H(A | B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b).H(A | B = b) = −
∑
b∈B
p(b).
∑
a∈A
p(a | b). log p(a | b).
(3.10)
where, p(b) is the probability mass function of B and p(a | b) is the conditional
probability of a value of A, a, given a value of B, b. The lower bound for Q
corresponds to the case where data is exactly k-Anonymous. In other words, suppose
that anonymous data has n records and each record has exactly the same quasi-
identifier record set as some other k − 1 subjects. In this situation, for each record
b, p(b) is 1/n. p(a | b) is 1/k for k records and 0 for the other n − k ones. By
evaluating Equation 4.13 with these values, we calculate the minimum anonymity
level of a k-Anonymous data, which is denoted as Qmin, as follows:
Qmin = log(k). (3.11)
On the other hand, the purpose of k-ACM is not to form clusters having exactly k
elements; it is to increase the quality of data as much as possible under the criterion
that each cluster must have at least k elements. Therefore, the number of clusters
produced by k-ACM is generally less than n/k and the number of elements of each
cluster is greater than or equal to k. Suppose that CF is the final set of clusters,
CiF is the i
th cluster and s(CiF )represents the number of elements in cluster C
i
F . Q
is computed as follows:
Q = −
∑
CiF∈CF
1
s(CiF )
. log
1
s(CiF )
. (3.12)
Uncertainty gets the lowest value when each cluster has exactly k elements. However,
uncertainty increases when clusters have different number of elements and number
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Figure 3.2: General Flowchart of k-ACM
of clusters gets lower. Therefore, the inequality, Q ≥ Qmin, holds for every possible
output of k-ACM.
3.5 k-Anonymous Clustering Method (k-ACM)
Our method, k-ACM, starts with the initialization phase where a new cluster is
created for each input vector. After the initialization, clustering operation starts
and clustering is performed. The general flowchart of the method is shown in Figure
3.2 and algorithm of k-ACM is given in Algorithm 3.2.
In the k-anonymization stage, k-ACM forms the clusters in a bottom-up fashion
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Algorithm 3.1 Function Cluster Combination
Input: parameter, k, distance matrix, Dh
Output: New cluster, Lhu, updated distance matrix, D
h+1
1: Find clusters, Lhs , L
h
t , having minimum distance in distance matrix D
h
2: create a new cluster Lh+1u
3: V h+1u ← V hs
⋃
V ht
4: |V h+1u | = |V hs |+ |V ht |
5: for each ith bit string of representative vector do
6: Rh+1u [i]← Rhs [i] or Rht [i]
7: end for
8: Remove clusters, Lhs , L
h
t
9: Find the distance of Lh+1u to other clusters, update D
h+1
Algorithm 3.2 Main Function of k-ACM
Input: Table, T , number of records, n, number of attributes, m, anonymization
parameter k
Output: k-anonymized table, k-ACM(T )
{Initialization}
1: h = 1
2: for all i where {i : 0 < i < n} do
3: Create cluster array, {L1i }
4: Add record, Ti to V
1
i
5: Set initial size of cluster, |V 1i | = 1
6: Initialize the representative vector, R1i ← Ti
7: Initialize the distance matrix D1 by using Equation 3.9
8: end for
{k-anonymization}
9: while not for each cluster |V hi | ≥ k do
10: Call Function ClusterCombination (k, Dh) given in Algorithm 3.1.
11: h=h+1
12: end while
{Form the output of k-ACM}
13: k-ACM(T )← ∅
14: for each c¯luster, Lhs in L
h where {s : 0 < s < |Lh|} do
15: Append Rhs and |V hs | to k-ACM(T )
16: end for
44
Figure 3.3: A sample tree structure of clusters obtained at the end of k-anonymization
like UPGMA until each cluster represented has at least k records. A sample tree
structure of clusters obtained at the end of the k-anonymization stage is shown in
Figure 3.3. Here, h1 is defined as the iteration number needed to complete the
k-anonymization stage. In this tree structure, each tree node represents a cluster
and cluster size is the number of records that belong to the corresponding cluster.
This tree has c1 root nodes, identified as Lh11 ..L
h1
c1 , and their sizes are at least k.
In each cluster combination operation, the closest clusters are found and a new
cluster, which contains all the vectors belonging to the chosen closest clusters, is
formed. Distance calculations are done according to Equation 3.9. Representative
vector of the new cluster is bitwise OR of representative vectors of child nodes.
Here, OR operation acts as a generalization operation and the clusters in higher
tree levels have more generalized representative vectors. A sample case for cluster
combination operation is shown in Figure 3.4. Suppose that the closest clusters
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Figure 3.4: A sample case for forming new cluster by combination of two closest cluster
in the hx iteration are Lhx1 , L
hx
2 and their representative vectors are R
hx
1 , R
hx
2 .
Assume that representative vectors have three bit strings each having a length of
four bits. This means there are three quasi-identifiers in the data set, all of them
are categorical and each categorical attribute may have four distinct values. The
new cluster is labelled by Lhx+11 . Its representative vector, R
hx+1
1 , is obtained by
ORing Rhx1 and R
hx
2 . Each cluster combination results in information loss due to
the increase in the number of true bits. Sizes of clusters, Lhx1 , L
hx
2 are represented
as |V hx1 | and |V hx2 | respectively. The size of new cluster, |V hx+11 |, is the summation
of the sizes of child nodes, |V hx1 | and |V hx2 |. The distance between Lhx1 and Lhx2 is
stored in the variable, Ihx+11 .
3.6 Termination Proof of k-ACM
Assume that at iteration h, the set of clusters is labelled as Lh, the total number of
clusters is |Lh| and ith cluster is represented as Lhi . The number of records is n. k
is the anonymity variable where k < n. Representative vector of cluster, Lhi , is R
h
i .
The number of elements is denoted as |V hi |.
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Lemma 1: If clusters, Lh1i for all i ∈ {1..|Lh1|} at iteration h1 of k-ACM, have
at least k items, h1 is the last iteration of k-ACM and the output of k-ACM has
k-anonymity property.
Proof:
k-ACM sends the representative vectors, Rh1i for all i ∈ {1..|Lh1|} with |V h1i |.
Since k-ACM guarantees the holding of inequality |V h1i | ≥ k for all i ∈ {1..|Lh1|},
each cluster forms an anonymity set having size k.Q.E.D.
Lemma 2:Maximum number of clusters at the end of k-ACM is (n/k). This
situation can be reached when all clusters have exactly k records (For simplicity,
assume that n is divisible by k).
Proof:
Assume that at iteration h1, k-ACM is terminated. Also assume that the Equa-
tion 3.13 is hold.
|Lh1| > (n/k). (3.13)
From Lemma 1, it is known that each cluster has at least k items. For total
number of records in all clusters, n, it can be stated that n ≥ k.|Lh1|. By using
Equation 3.13 we can conclude that n ≥ k.|Lh1| > n but a contradiction is reached.
We conclude that assumption about Equation 3.13 is wrong.
For the second part of Lemma 2, assume that for ith cluster, |V h1i | > k. Since all
other clusters has at least k records, the following inequality is hold: n − |V h1i | ≥
((n/k)−1)k. By adding each side of both inequalities we conclude that n > n which
is contradiction. Therefore, assumption is wrong. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: k-ACM terminates after at most n− 1 iterations.
Proof:
In each iteration of k-ACM, two closest clusters are chosen and merged. It
is guaranteed that in each iteration h, the number of clusters is equal to |Lh| =
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|Lh−1| − 1
Initially, for clusters L1i where for all i ∈ {1..|L1|}, |V hi | = 1 and |L1| = n.
Bottom-up clustering can continue until one cluster left. Suppose that at iteration
s, there is only one cluster Ls1. For the size of cluster, following equality holds:
|V s1 | = n. Since n > k, and by using Lemma 1, we can conclude that the output of
k-ACM has k-anonymity property. Since in each iteration, the number of clusters
is decreased by one, total number of iterations is n− 1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: k-ACM terminates after at least n−(n/k) iterations (for simplicity,
it is assumed that n is divisible by k).
Proof:
Initially number of clusters, |L1| is equal to n. In each iteration number of
clusters is decreased by one. According Lemma 2, the number of clusters produced
by k-ACM is maximum when each cluster has exactly k items. Therefore, maximum
number of clusters is equal to n/k. We can conclude that the minimum number of
iterations for decreasing n clusters to n/k clusters is n− (n/k). Q.E.D.
3.7 Worst Case Information Loss Analysis of k-
ACM
Assume that k is the anonymization parameter and also assume that data has n
records and m attributes where each attribute i has pi different attribute values. T
is the input data set for anonymization. IL(T ) is the information loss value of data
set T .
Lemma 3: k-ACM generates clusters having at most 2k − 1 records.
Proof:
In k -ACM, if any sth cluster of (h)th iteration, Lhs , has a size |V hs | > k then cluster
Lhs does not involve in any combination operation in later steps. If a cluster, L
h+1
u ,
48
is a result of combinations of two clusters, Lhs and L
h
t , we can say that |V hs | ≤ k
and |V ht | ≤ k. If both clusters have exactly k records they are not combined.
Therefore, this requirement can be revised so that |V hs | ≤ k and |V ht | < k. Since,
|V h+1u | = |V hs | + |V ht | then we can conclude that |V h+1u | < 2.k. Maximum value for
the number of records belonging to one cluster is 2k − 1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3: If for each pi where i ∈ {1..m}, pi = p and p < k, information loss
is log(p) in worst case.
Proof:
According to Equation 3.5, information is average of log of true bits in each
data entry. Representative vector of sth cluster in hth iteration is represented as
Rhs and i
th entry is Representative vector of sth cluster in hth iteration Rhs . R
h
s [i]
represents widest range when at least one record exists with each possible attribute
value. Since in output of k -ACM a cluster has at least k records, where p < k, it
is possible to have p distinct attributes in each cluster. In this situation, length of
ith bit string, Rhs [i], for each i where where i ∈ {1..m}, is p and each bit is actually
true bit. Therefore, information loss is log(p) in worst case. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4: If for each pi where i ∈ {1..m}, pi = p, h1 is the final iteration
and p ≥ 2k − 1, information loss is log(2k − 1) in worst case.
Proof:
From lemma 3, a cluster, Lhs has size |V hs | where |V hs | ≤ 2.k−1. Since p ≥ 2k−1,
widest value range of ith bit string of Rh1s , for each i where where i ∈ {1..m}, can be
set when each record in the cluster has different attribute value. In this situation,
each ith bit string of representative Rh1s [i] has a length of p and at most 2k − 1 of
them are true bits. According to Equation 3.5, information loss is log(2k − 1) in
worst case when p ≥ 2k − 1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5: If for each pi where i ∈ {1..m}, pi = p, h1 is the final iteration
and k ≤ p ≤ 2k − 1, then information loss is found as follows:
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IL(T ) ≤ 1/n.
∑
s∈Lh1
|V h1s |.log(min (|V h1s |, p)) (3.14)
Proof:
In each cluster, Lh1s , any i
th bit string Rh1s [i] has a length of p. Maximum infor-
mation loss occurs when each record has different attribute value. Since |V h1s | < p,
|V h1s | of p bits can be true bits at most. If |V h1s | > p, maximum information
loss occurs when all attribute values are covered by the records of cluster. All
bits of p bits are true bits in this situation. If we combine these two condi-
tions, we can conclude that number of true bits are determined by min(|V h1s |, p)
in each bit string of representative vectors. Therefore maximum information loss is
calculated as log(min(|V h1s |, p)). Total maximum amount of information loss of
a cluster, V h1s , is m.|V h1s |.log(min(|V h1s |, p)). Calculation of maximum informa-
tion loss belonging to all clusters is
∑
s∈Lh1 m.|V h1s |.log(min(|V h1s |, p)). informa-
tion loss of table T IL(T ), is calculated by the average information loss per data
entry according to Equation 3.5. Therefore, upper bound for IL(T ) is IL(T ) ≤
1/n.
∑
s∈Lh1 |V h1s |.log(min (|V h1s |, p)). Q.E.D.
3.8 Complexity Analysis of k-ACM
Suppose that k-ACM works on an input consisting of n event records and each record
has m attributes. All of the m attributes are quasi-identifier and each attribute has
distinct V different attribute value. Initialization phase mainly calculates the initial
distance matrix and the running time of this part is O(n2.m.V ). Initially there
are n clusters and at the end of k-anonymization phase, the minimum number of
clusters is n/k. Therefore, n − n/k cluster combination operation occurs. Cluster
combination consists of finding the minimum distance in the distance matrix and
matrix reorganizing so that the distance values of new cluster are added and distance
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values of previous clusters are removed. If binary heap structure is used for finding
minimum distance, formation of initial min heap structure with n2 elements is O(n2).
In a heap, finding the minimum operation is O(1). However, removing distances of
merged clusters from heap and adding the distances of new cluster to the heap
need 2n deletion and n addition operations which cost O(n log(n)). Reorganization
of distance matrix can be done in O(n.m.V ) time sequentially with maintaining
the heap. As a result, cost of each cluster combination operation is O(nlogn +
nmV ). Recall that maximum number of cluster combination operations is n− n/k,
the algorithm reaches to the end of k-anonymization phase in O(n2logn + n2mV ).
Output enlargement for partial encryption and formation of k-ACM output takes
O(n) time. Totally, k-ACM takes O(n2logn + n2.2mV ). m and V generally have
lower values so they can be assumed as a constant factor. The running time can be
fine-tuned to O(n2logn).
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Chapter 4
k-Anonymity based Framework for Privacy Preserving Data
Collection in Wireless Sensor Networks
Results of advances in sensor and wireless technology, wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) emerged as an important information gathering system from wide areas.
They are widely used for observing many physical phenomenons of world like tem-
perature, humidity etc. As wireless sensor technology takes progress, missions of
WSNs get complicated so that they are used in human, enemy, habitat, structure
or traffic monitoring applications. With the advent of wireless body are networks,
applications for health monitoring of patients outside the hospitals or home-caring
of elderly people have designed and implemented widely.
In recent sensor network applications, especially in object monitoring applica-
tions, the collected information is not an aggregated value like average temperature
or humidity value of a region; it may be about specific individuals or specific events
so that the privacy of each event information gets important. Moreover, the data
gathered in these and other sensor network applications may contain several at-
tributes for an entity. For example, traffic monitoring applications collect velocity,
direction and size information of a vehicle in addition to spatio-temporal informa-
tion. Collection of these attributes enables to launch re-identification attacks even
in the case where the identities are withheld.
In some sensor network applications, sensor nodes may deployed over grounds
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which are not physically protected; they exchange data without a fixed routing
structure; they try to gather various type of information from uncontrolled areas
and transfer them to the sinks in controlled or semi-controlled areas. Eavesdropping
and compromising of sink are major threats in such an un-controlled environment.
In addition to these threats, sink itself may not be considered as a fully trusted
party.
As the complexity of wireless sensor applications increase, structure of WSNs
have evolved in order to meet the new application requirements. WSNs generally
have many-to-one structure so that sensors collect event information from the area
and send to a unique sink. Some recent sensor applications have begun to use many-
to-many structure, which actually means there exist multiple sinks in the deployed
environment. WSN applications may need to send the same event information to
different sinks rather than a unique sink. For example, in a home-caring application
for elderly people, information about the elderly person can be sent to a family
member and to a nurse at the same time.
As information collection capability of WSNs are enhanced, privacy preserving
is getting one of the major problems in these networks. Huge amount of informa-
tion about an individual is collected and distributed. On the other side, individuals
generally need to restrict the details of personal information for privacy preserva-
tion. Therefore, countermeasures for privacy threats have to cover the both needs,
enabling data collection and restricting the storage of some private parts. Coun-
termeasures have to be designed so that they present protection for the threats of
WSN environment and take many-to-many WSN structures into consideration.
On the other side, in most of the WSNs, minimization of energy consumption
is one of the primary criteria due to limited battery capacity or unavailability of
battery replacements. All other security countermeasures as well as the privacy
preserving solutions have to perform their works with minimum energy.
53
In this chapter, proposed privacy framework is adapted to WSN applications for
two different threat models. First threat model consists of un-trusted eavesdropper
and semi-trusted sink. Here, semi-trusted notion is used for stating the level of pri-
vacy requirement. Semi-trusted sink means users are reluctant or required to share
their data with sink but they do not totally trust to this data collector point. Level
of privacy requirement of sink is lower than requirement of un-trusted eavesdropper.
The second threat model states that there exists multiple sinks each having dif-
ferent privacy levels. k-ACM is modified for each threat model. The modifications
and performance analyses of each solutions are presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
respectively. In both sections, k-ACM is modified so that the same data guaran-
tees the different privacy requirements of all threats. Proposed privacy solutions
aim to minimize energy consumption of WSN. They successfully create a trade-off
mechanism between information loss and energy consumption.
4.1 Semi-trusted Sink and Un-trusted Eavesdrop-
per
One of the major threats in wireless medium is eavesdropper threat. During the
transmission of gathered data to sink or central server, adversary having eavesdrop-
ping capability can sniff the network and get the event information. Since sensed
area is uncontrolled, adversary can use his own systems to collect extra information
from the area, join his knowledge with the sniffed event information and determine
the attributes of specific events, such as location and time. In WSN applications
of enemy tracing, habitat monitoring, traffic monitoring and human tracking [54],
eavesdropping threat have to be dealt with so that the privacy of data during the
transmission has to be provided.
The privacy problem is not limited to the threat of eavesdropper. In some
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situations, the data shared with sink or central server has to fulfill some privacy
requirements. There may be a threat of sink capture in some WSN environments
where physical security is not guaranteed. Physical capture of sink effects the whole
system since it stores all event information.
In some other applications, sink itself may not be considered as a fully trustable
entity by the WSN users. For example, consider a wireless body area network
system where the patient’s health status are centrally tracked by a central server
(i.e. the sink) in the hospital. Users may not want central server to know their
exact spatio-temporal information in non-urgent times. Therefore, it is needed to
provide privacy of personal information shared with the sink. People using WSN
applications like caring systems for elderly people or smart home monitoring systems
may need protection of their privacy from the parties where they share their personal
information.
Trusted data collection model used in privacy preserved data publishing methods
[2] does not fit directly to WSN environment since the data shared entity, sink, may
not be fully trusted and there may be other un-trusted parties like eavesdroppers.
Trusted entities where anonymization would be done have to be distributed so that
compromising of a trusted entity does not lead to loosing all data of system. A new
data collection model for a WSN environment has to be adopted.
The threat model is based on the threat due to untrusted eavesdropper and
threat due to semi-trusted sink. Therefore, model has two privacy criteria, k1-
anonymity for the data received by the semi-trusted sink and k2-anonymity for the
data transmitted in the network that can be captured by the untrusted eavesdropper,
where k2 ≥ k1.
Designers of privacy preserved data collection system for WSN have to concen-
trate on reducing the energy cost. Studies show that [55], energy consumption is
heavily dependent on transmission/reception of data packets. Therefore, shortening
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the size of event information plays a crucial role in energy reduction. In proposed
method, shortening of message sizes are accomplished by sending the common quasi-
identifier attributes of events only once to sink instead of sending the same data
iteratively for each event.
Encryption is introduced as an anonymity operation in addition to generaliza-
tion. Encryption enables to provide different privacy levels for eavesdropper and
sink. Appropriate encryption keys are shared between sink and sensor nodes where
anonymization takes place.
Proposed method first k1-anonymizes the data to a base level for semi-trusted
sink via generalization. Next step is to further anonymize the data against eaves-
droppers until the data becomes k2-anonymous with encryption and generalization
operations. For second step, trivial solution seems to be totally encrypting the
k1-anonymized data. If k2-anonymity is enough as a privacy requirement for the
eavesdroppers and some amount of data loss can be tolerated by the sink, instead of
fully encryption of k1-anonymous data, this data is k2-anonymized with encryption
and generalization operations. In the study, it is shown that this partial encryption
method considerably decreases the energy consumption by shortening the lengths
of messages.
4.1.1 Network and Threat Model
Wireless sensor networks generally deployed in open areas. Third parties can deter-
mine some attributes of detected events by using their own sensors or by directly
observing events. They can perform record linkage attack in order to identify the
event owner. Our threat model bases on providing privacy by preventing “record
linkage attack” during data collection.
The privacy threats are both due to the eavesdroppers and the sink. That is why
our threat model should address the privacy requirements of these two threat types.
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In our model, the privacy requirement levels of the system against the sink and
against the eavesdropper are not the same. Thus, we employ a privacy mechanism in
which there are two privacy levels associated with eavesdroppers and sink: untrusted
eavesdroppers and semi-trusted sink.
Untrusted eavesdroppers are assumed to be capable of capturing data, but the
system should ensure that the privacy of the captured data has to be protected to
some extent. In this way, the eavesdroppers can only learn limited information out
of the captured data.
On the other hand, semi-trusted sink is allowed to legally obtain data, but this
data should also have a specific privacy property. However, the privacy protection
level of the data that the sink obtains is lower than that of the eavesdroppers. In this
way, the sink can learn more detailed information as compared to the eavesdroppers,
but the information detail is still limited to some extent.
In our network model, there is one sink and a number of sensor nodes. Some
sensor nodes serve as aggregation nodes where all anonymization operations on the
data takes place. Therefore, our model protects the event data between aggregation
nodes and the sink.
In order to prevent “record linkage attack”, k-anonymity can be provided by
fusing different events. Therefore, trusted entities where anonymizations take place
have to be determined. Due to threats of WSN environment, these fuse points
have to be distributed so that capturing of one point do not lead to compromis-
ing of whole network data. Also it is convenient to choose points as much close as
possible to sensors. Therefore, aggregation nodes act as locally trusted parties for
the corresponding local sensors. Our anonymization framework solves the privacy
problem for the data travelling from aggregation nodes to sink. In Figure 4.1, the
basics of the network and threat models are shown. The links between sensor nodes
and aggregation nodes are assumed to be secure. Here, in order to provide confi-
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Figure 4.1: Visualization of Network and Threat Models
dentiality of the traffic between sensor nodes and aggregation node, an appropriate
key management mechanism [56, 57] could be employed. On the other hand, the
links between aggregation nodes and semi-trusted sink are assumed to be insecure.
Actually, we address the privacy issues of that part of the network in this chapter.
We assume that our WSN uses widely accepted data-centric routing protocols
like SPIN [58] or directed diffusion [59] for finding appropriate routes from sensors
to sink.
In our model, it is assumed that one individual generates one event in the
anonymization period. In other words, aggregation points process independent
events. In this way, we remove the possibility of having correlation among the
records that we anonymize.
4.1.2 Two Level Of Privacy with mk-ACM Method
In this section, modification of k-ACM Method that was described in Chapter 3
is given in order to fulfill the requirements of two different levels of anonymity.
New version of k -ACM is named as modified k-Anonymization Clustering Method
(mk-ACM).
mk-ACM starts with the initialization phase where a new cluster is created
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for each input vector as in k-ACM. After the initialization, clustering operation
starts and clustering is performed in two distinct stages, k1-anonymization and k2-
anonymization stages. mk-ACM is given in Algorithm 4.2. The notation table given
Table 3.1 is also used in this section.
Algorithm 4.1 Function Cluster Combination
Input: parameter, k, distance matrix, Dh
Output: New cluster, Lhu, updated distance matrix, D
h+1
1: Find clusters, Lhs , L
h
t , having minimum distance in distance matrix D
h
2: create a new cluster Lh+1u
3: V h+1u ← V hs
⋃
V ht
4: |V h+1u | = |V hs |+ |V ht |
5: for each ith bit string of representative vector do
6: Rh+1u [i]← Rhs [i] or Rht [i]
7: end for
8: Remove clusters, Lhs , L
h
t
9: Find the distance of Lh+1u to other clusters, update D
h+1
In the k1-anonymization stage (9-12. items in Algorithm 4.2), mk-ACM forms
the clusters in a bottom-up fashion until each cluster represented has at least
k1 records. A sample tree structure of clusters obtained at the end of the k1-
anonymization stage is shown in Figure 4.2. Here, h1 is defined as the iteration
number needed to complete the k1-anonymization stage. This tree has c1 root
nodes, identified as Lh11 ..L
h1
c1 , and their sizes are at least k1.
In the k2-anonymization stage (14-17. item in Algorithm 4.2, bottom-up clus-
tering starts with the clusters represented by the root nodes of k1-anonymization
tree and continues until all the root nodes of tree have sizes of at least k2, where
k2 ≥ k1. A tree structure obtained at the end of k2-anonymization stage is shown in
Figure 4.3. Here, h2 is defined as the iteration number after which all the root nodes
have at least k2 items and bottom-up clustering is completed. This tree structure
has c1 leave nodes, Lh11 ..L
h1
c1 and c2 root nodes, L
h2
1 ..L
h2
c2 .
59
Algorithm 4.2 Main Function of mk-ACM
Input: Table, T , number of records, n, number of attributes, m, anonymization
parameters k1, k2 (k2 ≥ k1), output enlargement factor, M
Output: Anonymized table, mk-ACM(T )
1: h = 1 {Initialization}
2: for all i where {i : 0 < i < n} do
3: Create cluster array, {L1i }
4: Add record, Ti to V
1
i
5: Set initial size of cluster, |V 1i | = 1
6: Initialize the representative vector, R1i ← Ti
7: Initialize the distance matrix D1 by using Equation 3.9
8: end for
{k1-anonymization}
9: while not for each cluster |V hi | ≥ k1 do
10: Call Function ClusterCombination (k1, Dh)
11: h = h+ 1
12: end while
13: c1 = |Lh|, h1 = h
{k2-anonymization}
14: while not for each cluster |V hi | ≥ k2 do
15: Call Function ClusterCombination (k2, Dh) given in Algorithm 4.1
16: h = h+ 1
17: end while
18: c2 = |Lh|, h2 = h
19: Initialize the set of vectors to be sent to sink, S, by clusters Lh21 , ..., L
h2
c2 (|S| = c2)
20: ϕ = c2 +M.(c1 − c2) (ϕ is max. number of representative vector allowed for
sending)
{Output enlargement for partial encryption}
21: while not |S| = ϕ do
22: Select the node, f , with the maximum information loss in S
23: Find the child nodes, g and h, of node f
24: Modify S by replacement of node f with nodes g and h
25: end while
26: mk-ACM(T )← ∅
{(Form the output of mk-ACM)}
27: for each cluster, C, in S do
28: if |C| ≥ k2 then
29: Append representative vector of C and |C| to mk-ACM(T )
30: else
31: Append |C| and encrypted version of C to mk-ACM(T )
32: end if
33: end for
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Figure 4.2: A sample tree structure of clusters obtained at the end of k1-anonymization
stage
Figure 4.3: A sample tree structure of clusters obtained at the end of k2-anonymization
stage
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Before explaining 21-25. items of mk-ACMmethod in Algorithm 4.2, the motiva-
tion behind output enlargement and partial encryption is given below. As discussed
before, information loss is an important design criterion in mk-ACM. Another im-
portant criterion is energy saving. Sensor nodes are scattered in an area where there
is no power supply other than a simple battery. Therefore, increasing the lifetime of
battery is desired in almost all WSN applications. A sensor node consumes energy
for different processes like event sensing, CPU processing, or transmitting/receiving
data packets. Although encryption process needs a considerable amount of CPU
processing, recent studies [55] show that energy consumption rates for transmis-
sion/reception is over three orders of magnitude greater than the energy consump-
tion rates for encryption. Since each sensor node acts as a router for the messages of
other nodes and one message goes over many hops in the network, energy saving for
transmission/reception operations becomes a crucial design criterion. These facts
direct the wireless sensor network (WSN) designers to shorten the length of the
packets.
Actually, there is a tradeoff between information loss and energy consumption.
We analyze this tradeoff in two extreme cases of mk-ACM method.
1. Make the data k2-anonymous via generalization operations at aggregation
points and send it to the semi-trusted sink. This case corresponds to the case
where the data computed at the end of 14-17. items of Algorithm 4.2 are sent
to the sink.
2. Make the data k1-anonymous with generalization operations, encrypt all this
anonymous data by a shared key with the semi-trusted sink and send it to the
sink. This case corresponds to the case where the data obtained at the end of
12. item of Algorithm 4.2 are entirely encrypted.
Both cases fulfill the requirements of our threat model. In the first case, at which
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only generalization is performed, the length of the data is minimized and the number
of encryptions is zeroed. In this way, energy consumption is also minimized. How-
ever, due to the generalization operations, information loss is maximized in this case.
In the second extreme case, since only encryption is performed, the length of the
data transmitted is maximized. This yields maximized energy consumption. How-
ever, since encrypted data will be decrypted at sink, there is no extra information
loss here.
In order to cope with the trade-off between energy consumption and information
loss more efficiently, we introduced an intelligent partial encryption alternative in
mk-ACM. In mk-ACM, there is an allowance for encryption operations in the k2-
anonymization stage. Basically, mk-ACM uses this allowance for the data portions
that have high potential for information loss when generalization was applied.
mk-ACM can effectively find the appropriate data entries for encryption oper-
ations (21-25. items of mk-ACM method in Algorithm 4.2) as described below. It
firstly k2-anonymizes the data (14-17. items of mk-ACM algorithm) as depicted as
a tree structure in Figure 4.3. Let us define the set S as the set of all representative
vectors to be sent to the sink. Initially the set S contains c2 nodes, which are root
nodes of the tree, Lh21 ..L
h2
c2 . All of these nodes are k2-anonymized. If no encryptions
are allowed, this initial content of S is sent to sink that causes maximum informa-
tion loss as discussed above. To reduce information loss, the encrypted versions of
representative vectors with k-anonymization levels less than k2 can be sent to sink.
This process requires moving down the tree in Figure 4.3. In other words, some
nodes in S are replaced by their children. This is done in an iterative manner until
a certain limit. At each iteration, mk-ACM chooses the element of S with highest
information loss and this element is replaced by its child nodes. This replacement
increases the size of data sent to sink by one vector, but the quality of data is also
increased since we now discarded some generalization operations by moving down
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Figure 4.4: Selection of data entries for encryption
the tree.
An example is depicted in Figure 4.4. Assume that node, Lh2a , has the maximum
information loss and nodes, Lh2−1cx , L
h2−1
cy are its child nodes. L
h2
a is replaced by its
child nodes and the set S is now composed of nodes, Lh21 ..L
h2−1
cx , L
h2−1
cy ..L
h2
c2 . By this
replacement, we can cancel the information loss that have had occurred after the
merging of nodes, Lh2−1cx , L
h2−1
cy . Therefore, the quality of data represented by the
new set S is greater than the previous one. However, the length of S is increased
by one, Lh2−1cx and L
h2−1
cy must be encrypted since they are not k2-anonymized.
In 21-25. items of mk-ACM given in Algorithm 4.2, the number of replacements
is adjusted by a predetermined threshold value, output enlargement factor,M , where
0 ≤M ≤ 1. This value determines the maximum size of S, which is c2+M(c1− c2)
vectors. The replacement continues until the size of S reaches this value.
After the end of replacement process, vectors of nodes in S are transmitted to the
sink together with the node sizes (27-33. items of mk-ACM). Before transmission,
representative vectors of nodes having anonymity levels less than k2 are encrypted in
order to make the data k2-anonymous for eavesdroppers. The other vectors, which
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are actually k2-anonymous, are sent in clear-text.
In mk-ACM, M determines the tradeoff between information loss and energy
saving. If M is zero, then c2 k2-anonymized data entries are sent to sink and
none of them are encrypted. This corresponds to the first extreme case explained
above. However, if M is one, then the output includes c1 vectors and all of them
are encrypted. This corresponds to the second extreme case discussed above. In
general, large M values mean greater output size and more quality data at the cost
of higher energy consumption for both communication and encryption. Small M
values mean smaller output size and less quality data at the benefit of less energy
consumption. The analysis for this tradeoff is given in Section 4.1.4.
Network-wide Operation of mk-ACM
In our network model, there are many aggregation nodes that obtain local event data
from regular sensor nodes and forward toward the sink after applying mk-ACM to
the data. Therefore, mk-ACM algorithm runs in each aggregation node in parallel.
The pseudo-code which shows the network-wide operation of mk-ACM in a par-
allel manner is shown in Algorithm 4.3.
Algorithm 4.3 Network-wide operation of mk-ACM algorithm in a parallel manner
1: for each aggregation node in parallel do
2: while while time period is not exceeded or buffer of node is not full do
3: Collect and accumulate local event information from sensors
4: end while
5: Run mk-ACM
6: Send the output of mk-ACM to the sink
7: end for
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4.1.3 k-Anonymization Output Size and Energy Saving
In our study, k-anonymization is considered as a privacy mechanism; however, k-
anonymization shortens the length of the event messages as well. In this way, energy
consumption is reduced. Basically, k-anonymization makes the quasi-identifier fields
of k or more records identical. It is not needed to resend these identical parts again
and again. These parts can be sent to the sink only once along with the number
of occurrences. By this reduction technique, the data is shortened as well although
information about the individual events is conserved.
In section 4.1.2, it is described that actually the mk-ACM output is composed
of representative vectors of clusters and their sizes. The number of representative
vectors is determined by the value of c2+M(c1−c2) in whichM is the predetermined
threshold value, called output enlargement factor. This variable can take values from
zero to one. As a result the range for number of vectors is [c2, c1]. Assume that
in the data, there are n records, m categorical attributes and each attribute has p
distinct attribute value. k1, k2 are the parameters of the k-anonymization. The size
of clusters cannot exceed 2k2, therefore cluster size can be represented in the output
with at most log(2k2)bits. Total length of all representative vectors of clusters and
their cluster sizes can be at most (c2 +M(c1 − c2)).(mp+ log(2k2)). Originally, the
size of data is mn log p. Decrease ratio, D, is described as the ratio of difference
of input and output size to the input size in a k-anonymization operation. D is
computed for overall k-ACM output as follows:
D =
mn log(p)− (c2 +M(c1− c2)).(mp+ log(2k2))
mn log(p)
. (4.1)
Decrease ratio directly affects the energy consumption by saving certain amount
of energy due to reduced length of data transferred towards the sink. The energy
saving metric, CG, is defined as the ratio of saved amount of energy due to k-
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anonymization. By using the decrease ratio, D, energy saving, CG, is calculated as
follows:
CG = 1− 2.5hsregion + 2.5(1−D)hregion + 8.58 10
−4β
2.5(hsregion + hregion)
. (4.2)
where, hsregion is the expected number of hops an event message travels from a
sensor node to the aggregation node; hregion is the expected number of hops from
aggregation points to the sink; D is the decrease ratio and β is the number of
encrypted entries where it is actually M(c1 − c2). Derivations for hsregion, hregion
and CG are given as follows:
Suppose the WSN field has the size of Xregion.Yregion. Aggregation nodes are
uniformly deployed in this area. Sink is located at the middle of the region, so
the coordinates of the sink is (Xregion/2, Yregion/2). Assume that aggregation nodes
divide the entire region into sub-regions each having sizes of (Xsregion, Ysregion). Each
aggregation node is located in the middle of the corresponding sub-region. The
sensor nodes are also uniformly distributed in each sub-region. Expected distance
value of a sensor node to an aggregation node, dsregion, in a sub-region is calculated
as follows:
dsregion =
∫ Xsregion
x=0
∫ Ysregion
y=0
√
(x− (Xsregion/2))2 + (y − (Ysregion/2))2f(x)f(y)dxdy.
(4.3)
Here, f(x) and f(y) are the probability distribution functions of sensor coordinates.
Since sensor nodes are uniformly distributed in the sub-region, they are chosen as
f(x) = 1/Xsregion and f(y) = 1/Ysregion. The expected number of hops an event
message travels from a sensor node to the aggregation node is:
hsregion = dsregion/R. (4.4)
From sensor node to the aggregation node, an event message travels hsregion hops
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which is calculated as follows:
dsregion =
∫ Xsregion
x=0
∫ Ysregion
y=0
√
(x− (Xsregion/2))2 + (y − (Ysregion/2))2
XsregionYsregionR
dxdy. (4.5)
The number of hops between aggregation node and sink, hregion, is calculated as in
the following:
dregion =
∫ Xregion
x=0
∫ Yregion
y=0
√
(x− (Xregion/2))2 + (y − (Yregion/2))2
XregionYregionR
dxdy. (4.6)
In WSNs, event information flows from sensor node to aggregation node, then to the
sink. k-anonymization operations take place at aggregation nodes so the shortening
effect helps to consume less energy while transferring event data from aggrega-
tion node to the sink. These operations consume additional energy for encryption
and decryption operations, but the energy spent for encryption and decryption is
quite small as compared to energy spent for transmission and reception. Energy
consumption parameters are determined according to the experimental results pre-
sented in [55]. We assume that the data is processed in Sensoria’s WINS NG RF
subsystem with MIPS R400 processor where encryption algorithm is AES. The
transmission/reception, transmission/encryption and encryption/decryption energy
consumption ratios for the same length of data are shown in Table 10. The trans-
mission and reception rate is taken as 10 Kbps and power is 10mW. In all energy
calculations, only event data processes are taken into consideration. Energy con-
sumed for exchanging routing information or energy that is exhausted during idle
times of sensors are excluded from calculations in order to accurately calculate the
energy consumption of the proposed method. Suppose that WSN generates event
messages which are e bytes long and we assume that transmission energy TT is 1.5
units (the actual unit is not so important since we eventually calculate energy saving
as a ratio), reception energy TR is 1 unit, encryption and decryption energy, TE and
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Table 4.1: Energy Consumption Ratios
Energy Consumption Ratios Ratio Value
Transmission/Reception 1.5
Transmission/Encryption 2333.34
Encryption/Decryption 1
TD, are 4.29e-4 units.
Total consumed energy without k-anonymization is denoted as CN . In this case,
all event messages are sent to aggregation node, but aggregation node just relays
them to the sink without any performing k-anonymization operation. At each hop,
each event packet is transmitted and received once so consumed energy in one hop
is (TT + TR)e which is actually 2.5e units. The number of hops that each event
message is transmitted is hregion + hsregion. The energy consumption, CN , can now
be calculated as follows:
CN = (hregion + hsregion)(TT + TR)e = (hregion + hsregion)2.5e. (4.7)
Total consumed energy in the case where k-anonymization is used is denoted
by CK . The length of an event message, which is transferred from a sensor node
to an aggregation node, is assumed to be e bytes. However, this length is re-
duced to (1 − D)e after the aggregation node due to the shortening affect of the
k-anonymization. Here, D is the decrease ratio of the k-anonymization operation.
Suppose that Moreover, in this case, β bytes of the event message are encrypted.
The energy consumption, CK , can now be calculated as follows:
CK = hsregione(TT + TR) + hregion(1−D)e(TT + TR) + β(TE + TD). (4.8)
Total energy saving CG is calculated as follows:
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CG = 1− CK
CN
= 1− 2.5hsregione+ 2.5hregion(1−D)e+ 8.58 10
−4β
(hregion + hsregion)2.5e
. (4.9)
In order to calculate the energy saving just after k1-anonymization stage of k-
ACM algorithm, decrease ratio at this stage, Dk1−anonymization, have to be calculated.
For this calculation Equation 4.1 is needed to be revised. The number of represen-
tative vectors at this stage is c1 and a cluster size occupies log(2k1) bit length.
Dk1−anonymization is found as follows:
Dk1−anonymization =
mn log(p)− c1.(mp+ log(2k1))
mn log(p)
. (4.10)
If the value of D in Equation 4.2 is replaced with Dk1−anonymization, then the en-
ergy saving that is guaranteed at the end of k1-anonymization stage is calculated.
Decrease ratio in k2-anonymization stage is calculated as follows:
Dk2−anonymization =
c1.(mp+ log(2k1))− (c2 +m(c1− c2)).(mp+ log(2k2))
c1.(mp+ log(2k1))
.
(4.11)
Energy saving in this stage can be calculated by Equation 4.2 where D is actually
Dk2−anonymization.
Compression is a good additional mechanism to reduce energy by decreasing
message lengths during data transmission and reception. It can be applied to both
anonymized and non-anonymized data. In order to show relative benefit on energy
consumption of our k-anonymity framework, we do not applied compression. How-
ever, WSN owners may also use compression for the outputs of our framework to
further reduce energy consumption.
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4.1.4 Performance Evaluation of mk-ACM
In this part, trade-off between information loss and energy saving is investigated by
applying mk-ACM to synthetic data under different k1 and k2 values. A data record
has five categorical attributes. Each attribute is considered as a quasi-identifier and
has four distinct values. Synthetic data is generated randomly by using uniform
distribution.
In the first subsection, the performance of k1-anonymization stage is evaluated.
Especially, information loss in the data shared with the semi-trusted sink is an
important evaluation criterion in this stage. The second subsection evaluates the
performance of dynamic taxonomy trees. The third subsection focuses on the per-
formance of mk-ACM in the k2-anonymization stage.
Performance Evaluation of k1-anonymization Stage
We analyze the performance of k1-anonymization stage using the information loss,
anonymity level and energy saving metrics. In this way, the performance of bottom-
up clustering method as a general k-anonymity solution is investigated. Table 4.2
gives the performance values for a data set with 500 records. The column named ‘Re-
quired Anonymity Level’ gives the minimum anonymity score of the k1-anonymous
data according to Equation 3.11. This anonymity score is obtained if all clusters
have exactly k1 elements at the end of mk-ACM. However, the primary focus of
our algorithm is making data at least k1-anonymous with minimum information
loss. Therefore, the number of elements in the clusters may exceed k1. Due to this
fact, the actual anonymity level of each case, which is shown in the column labelled
‘Anonymity Level’, is generally greater than the corresponding ‘required anonymity
level’ value. ‘Information Loss’ column gives the information loss of k1-anonymity
operation by using the conditional entropy of Equation 3.5. The last column of Ta-
ble 4.2, ‘Energy Saving’, gives the energy saving of mk-ACM in k1-anonymization
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Table 4.2: Experimental results of data set with 500 records for the k1-anonymous stage
k1 value Required Anonymity Anonymity Information Loss Energy Saving
Level Level (bits) (%)
Value Range:[0.0 2.0]
3 1.58 2.11 0.54 27
4 2 2.25 0.47 34
5 2.32 2.82 0.77 52
8 3 3.41 0.93 65
stage within the whole energy consumption of WSN due to the reformatting oper-
ation proposed in algorithm. In this reformatting operation, the iterated parts in
the k-anonymous data is sent once together with the number of occurrences of these
iterated parts in the data. In this way, the length of messages decreases. Energy
saving at the end of k1-anonymization stage is calculated using Equation 4.2 and
Equation 4.10. In our analysis, we take the size of WSN field as 500m x 500m,
size of each sub-region as 50m x 50m and the transmission range, R, as 10m. As
expected, the information loss increases as the anonymity level increases. Informa-
tion loss of 3-anonymous data is 0.54 and the whole system energy saving ratio is
0.27. 5-anonymous data provide an optimal solution such that the information loss
value, 0.77, is tolerable and energy saving, 0.52, is quite high. For 8-anonymous
data, energy saving is very high (0.65), however, information loss is also high (0.93)
that makes the data low quality.
In Figure 4.5, the effect of change in the number of records to the information loss
is analyzed for various k1 values. For a given k1 value, information loss has a general
decreasing pattern as the number of records increases. The main reason behind
this decrease in information loss is that while the number of records increase, data
naturally becomes k1-anonymous and fewer generalizations are performed. However,
in a few cases (e.g. transition from 500 to 600 records for k1 = 8), information loss
increases as opposed to general decreasing pattern. These exceptions are due to the
nature of the clustering mechanism. The clustering mechanism may occasionally
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Figure 4.5: Information loss versus record number for different k1 values
cause a higher average number of data records per cluster as the number of records
increase. This may cause a slight increase in information loss in some cases.
In above experiments, we use data which are generated randomly by using uni-
form distribution We also performed experiments by using data which are generated
by some non-uniform irregular distributions. In terms of information loss, the re-
sults of data with non-uniform distributions are better than the ones with uniform
distribution in these experiments. If the data is produced by non-uniform distribu-
tions, some input vectors are closer to each other. Information loss of those vectors
are lower at the end of the anonymization. In other words, by using uniformly
distributed data, we presented the worst case performance of our method in Ta-
ble 4.2 and Figure 4.5. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we do not give the
experimental results obtained by using non-uniformly distributed data.
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Performance Analysis of Dynamic vs Static Taxonomy Trees
Notion of dynamic taxonomy tree is proposed in k-ACM and mk-ACM in order to
minimize information loss. However, the length of anonymized data produced by
using this type of tree is much more than the data generated by static taxonomy
tree. A categorical attribute having p distinct attribute values can be represented
by p bits according to dynamic taxonomy tree method. If static tree having t total
nodes (including leaves and internal nodes) is chosen, the length of data would be
log(t). The value of t can have the maximum value, 2p− 1, when the tree is binary
and can have the minimum value, p+1, when all leave nodes are directly connected
to a root node. Therefore, range of data length is between [log(p+ 1), log(2p− 1)].
For all p ≥ 2, static tree data representation is shorter and the length difference gets
enormously bigger as p increases.
As stated before, energy consumption of WSN is mostly determined by the length
of messages transferred in the network. Actually, there is a trade-off between data
utility and energy consumption in choosing the dynamic taxonomy tree method as
a data representation method. In this section of chapter, this trade-off is analyzed
by experiments.
In the experiments, the number of input records is chosen as 500. Input records
have five categorical attributes where each of them is determined as quasi-identifier.
Each categorical attribute has six distinct attribute values. It is assumed that
the tree given in Figure 4.6 is the static taxonomy tree used for representation of
attributes. The tree consists of one root node, two internal nodes and six leave nodes.
The length of each attribute is represented by 6 bits in dynamic tree whereas it is
represented by dlog(9)e = 4 bits in static taxonomy tree. Generalization is actually
replacing the attributes with their common ancestor in static tree. In order to
be consistent with the other experimental results, information loss metric given in
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 is used. Final information loss is calculated by converting
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Figure 4.6: A Static Taxonomy Tree Sample
Table 4.3: Experimental results of data set with 500 records for Comparison of Static and
Dynamic Taxonomy Trees
k value Info. Loss of Energy Gain of Info. Loss of Energy Gain of
Static Taxonomy Static Taxonomy Dynamic Taxonomy Dynamic Taxonomy
Tree (bits) Tree (%) Tree (bits) Tree (%)
Value Range: [0.0 2.58] Value Range: [0.0 2.58]
4 1.39 65 0.87 36
5 1.48 69 1.06 48
8 1.95 80 1.48 66
10 1.96 81 1.61 70
categorical attributes of static taxonomy tree into equivalent bit strings at the end.
If attribute is generalized into an internal node, all bits corresponding to the children
of that node is converted to ‘1’.
The results of experiments are shown in Table 4.3. Each row corresponds to
results of information loss and energy saving values of using static or dynamic tax-
onomy tree methods for each given k value. Tree given in Figure 4.6 is chosen as a
static taxonomy tree. As expected, the information loss caused by dynamic tree is
considerable smaller than the loss generated by static tree. For example, in experi-
ment where k is chosen as 5, information loss of dynamic tree is 1.48 bits. However,
this value is 1.95 bits in static tree. On the other side, energy saving of static tree
method is higher due to the smaller lengths of data representations.
The ratio of energy saving (ES) to the information loss, ES/IL, is determined
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for better analysis of trade-off between data utility and energy consumption. The
number of input records is 500 each having 5 categorical attributes. Experiments
are repeated for different static taxonomy tree structures given in Figure 4.1.4. The
numbers of distinct attribute values are 4, 6 and 9 respectively. Ratios, ES/IL,
are calculated in each experiment using dynamic and static taxonomy trees as given
in Figure 4.8. As a general, in terms of ES/IL, there is no any major difference
between dynamic and taxonomy tree methods. Dynamic one maximizes data utility
by paying higher costs for energy. If WSN has limited resources for energy and if
owners of WSN can tolerate information loss, dynamic taxonomy tree method can
be considered as best alternative.
(a) Tree with 4 distinct attribute values (b) Tree with 6 distinct attribute values
(c) Tree with 9 distinct attribute values
Figure 4.7: Static taxonomy trees for different number of attribute values
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Dynamic Taxonomy Tree−9 distinct attr. val.
Figure 4.8: Comparison of Static and Dynamic Taxonomy Trees
Performance Evaluation of k2-anonymization Stage
k2-anonymization stage starts with the k1-anonymous data obtained from the pre-
vious stage. Output enlargement factor, M , adjusts the length of output that is
obtained at the end of the k2-anonymization stage. As M increases, the size of
the output and consequently the number of encrypted data entries increases as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.2. Increase in the number of encrypted data entries creates
more accurate output and decreases information loss.
Table 4.4, gives the experimental results for a data set having 500 records where
k1 = 4 and k2 = 16. First column gives the value of output enlargement factor, M ,
that is pre-determined for the corresponding experiment. The second column shows
the anonymity level that the output provides and it is computed according to Equa-
tion 3.12. This anonymity level is obtained after the encrypted parts are decrypted at
the sink. Third column gives the information loss occurred only in k2-anonymization
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stage.It is actually the difference between information loss occurred at the end of
k2-anonymization stage and information loss at the end of k1-anonymization stage.
Since information loss of 4-anonymous data is 0.47 and information loss can be at
most 2.0, information loss that can occur during k2-anonymization can be found as
at most 1.53.
Equation 3.5 is used for computations of information losses. Energy saving values
in k2-anonymization stage are given in the fourth column. Decrease ratio of this
stage is calculated by Equation 4.11 and energy saving is found by Equation 4.2.
Energy saving values indicate the energy savings as compared to the extreme case
where the entire k1-anonymous data is encrypted. Last row actually shows this
extreme case. Here, M = 1, which means output length is maximum and all the
data is encrypted. Therefore, information loss and energy saving are zero. The
first row shows the other extreme case where the data is k2-anonymized using only
generalizations without any encryption. The anonymity level of 4.88 indicates that
the data received at the sink are already 16-anonymous, which is more than enough.
In this case, the quality of data is very low but energy saving has a maximum value
of 0.76. When M is increased to 0.25, some of the data entries are encrypted. The
anonymity level of decrypted data at the sink decreases to 3.72 and the energy
saving decreases to 0.54.
Information loss and energy saving trade-off can easily observed in Table 4.4; as
the information loss decreases energy saving also decreases. The designer of WSN
can decide on the value ofM according to the experimental results about information
loss and energy saving, and using its system parameters and requirements. If the
system can tolerate more information loss, it is possible to save considerable amount
of energy. If energy consumption is not an important issue in the WSN, the quality
of data can be easily increased.
The information loss at the k2-anonymization stage is analyzed in Figure 4.9 by
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Table 4.4: Experimental results of data set with 500 records for k2-anonymization part
Output Enlargement Anonymity Level Information Loss Energy Saving
Ratio (bits)
Value Range:[0.0 1.53]
0.0 4.88 0.95 0.76
0.25 3.72 0.54 0.57
0.50 3.07 0.29 0.38
0.75 2.67 0.13 0.19
1.00 2.25 0.00 0.00
using different M values and different k1, k2 pairs where number of records is 500.
As expected, increase in M decreases data loss. Again as expected, high k2 values
cause higher information loss as compared to low k2 values. However, this difference
becomes marginal as M increases. Moreover Figure 4.9 also shows that, especially
for high k2 values, k-ACM reduces the information loss quickly for small M values.
Figure 4.10 shows the change of energy saving with respect to output enlargement
factor for various (k1, k2) pairs. As expected, higherM values result in lower energy
saving. As in the information loss case shown in Figure 4.9, high k2 values cause
more energy saving, but this advantage becomes marginal asM increases. However,
differently from the information loss decrease shown in Figure 4.9, the decrease in
energy saving is linear.
The purpose of mk-ACM is maximization of energy saving and minimization of
information loss. This tradeoff is managed via M . In order to do a better analysis
of this tradeoff in k2-anonymization stage, we analyze the ratio of energy saving to
the information loss (ES/IL) for networks with different k1 and k2 values. These
results are depicted in Figure 4.11. Higher ES/IL ratio shows the effectiveness of
output enlargement factor at this stage. It is observed that ES/IL ratio constantly
increases as M increases. This fact constitutes another proof for the effectiveness
of mk-ACM algorithm. Although ES/IL has a constant increasing pattern, this
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Figure 4.9: Output enlargement factor vs. Information Loss at the k2-Anonymization
Stage
Figure 4.10: Output enlargement factor vs. Energy Saving at the k2-Anonymization Stage
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Figure 4.11: Energy Saving/Information Loss for Different M values at the k2-
Anonymization Stage
does not mean that the highest (i.e. 1.0) M value must be chosen all the time
since such a high M does not help to save considerable energy as shown in Figure
4.10. Actually, the network administrators should choose the largest M value that
gives the required information loss and/or energy saving values. In this way, the
tradeoff between information loss and energy saving can be dynamically managed
by playing with M . For example, consider a network with k1 = 4 and k2 = 10. If
the maximum information loss that this network can tolerate is 0.40, then Figure
4.9 suggests to use theM = 0.3. In this situation, the network provides the required
anonymity levels by saving 47% energy as shown in Figure 4.10. On the other hand
for the same network, if the limitation is to save at least 60% of energy, then M is
chosen as 0.10. In this case, information loss becomes 0.59 for the same anonymity
levels.
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4.2 Multiple Sinks
In this section, k-ACM method is adapted as a privacy framework for WSN applica-
tions having multiple sinks. Collected event information is iteratively k-anonymized
for all sinks each having different privacy levels. Encryption operation with ap-
propriate key management schema is used in addition to generalization in order to
meet the different requirements in one k-anonymized output. Achieving all privacy
requirements in one output considerably decreases the energy consumption so that
this output can be multicasted to multiple sinks instead of sending different outputs
for each sink. Bottom-up clustering idea is used during k-anonymization process.
4.2.1 Network and Threat Model
Our threat model bases on the requirement that the individuals do not want sinks
to identify their records among other records of k individuals within a specified
time-frame through the quasi-identifier fields of records.
The required privacy levels of each sink differs so that suppose that there are
n sinks, each ith sink has a privacy level pi where each level requires to share ki-
anonymous data with ith sink and inequality of k1 < k2 < ... < kn is valid.
Sensors are clustered in separate sensor groups according to sensor localizations
where each group has a group head sensor. In our method, each sensor conveys
its readings to group heads, they k-anonymizes data and multicast the anonymized
output to all sinks when multicasting has advantage in terms of energy saving.
Network model is shown in Figure 4.12.
In our model, it is assumed that one individual generates one event in the
anonymization period. In other words, group head sensors process independent
events. In this way, we remove the possibility of having correlation among the
records that we anonymize.
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Figure 4.12: Network Model
4.2.2 Iterative k-ACM (Ik-ACM)
In the WSN, there are n sinks and n − 1 symmetric encryption keys which are
labelled as e1, e2, ..., en−1. ith sink contains list of the keys as ei, ei+1, ..., en−1. Each
group head sensors store all the n−1 keys. In the proposed method, anonymization
is completed in n iterative steps as shown Figure 4.13. In the first step, by using
only generalization operation, input data is k1-anonymized. In the second step,
k1-anonymized data is k2-anonymized by encrypting the chosen data parts with e1.
For each ith step to nth step, anonymization is done by encryption using key, ei−1.
The output after nth step is multicasted to all sinks.
After the arrival of anonymous data to sink, each sink decrypts the data with
their keys. The resulting data after decryption actually has the level of privacy
required for that sink. ith sink can only decrypt the data which is encrypted after
the ith iterations; because it has the corresponding keys. Data parts encrypted by
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Figure 4.13: Steps of Iterative Anonymization
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the keys, e1, e2, ..., ei−2, cannot be decrypted, therefore they can be considered as
suppression operations for that sink. 1st sink, which has to get data with lowest
privacy criteria, can decrypt all the encrypted parts and the result data is actually
k1-anonymized. On the other hand, n
th sink has not any key and gathers data as
kn-anonymized.
Encryption is used as an anonymity operation in all anonymization steps ex-
cept k1-anonymization. Assume that two clusters, Lsh, L
t
h are chosen as the closest
cluster pair at hth iteration of Ik-ACM and this iteration corresponds to (i + 1)th-
anonymization step. The newly created cluster is labelled as Lsth and Eei(x) rep-
resents the encrypted output of input x with key ei. Formation of representative
vector for newly created cluster, Rsth , is given in Algorithm 4.4.
Algorithm 4.4 Forming Representative Vector in Ik-ACM
Input: Representative vectors, Rth, R
t
h
Output: Representative vector of new cluster, Rsth
1: for each attribute m do
2: if Rsh[m] = R
t
h[m] then
3: Rsth [m] = R
t
h[m]
4: else
5: Rsth [m] = Eei(R
s
h[m]||Rth[m])
6: end if
7: end for
A sample cluster combination by encryption operation is shown in Figure 4.14.
Assume that represented vectors of two closest clusters, Lht and L
h
s are ‘0011 0010
1000’ and ‘0100 0010 1000’, respectively. The values of vectors indicate that data
records have three attributes each having four distinct attribute values. First bit
strings of vectors, ‘0011’ and ‘0100’ are compared. Since they are not identical,
concatination of values are encrypted. This encryption result forms the first bit
string of representative vector of newly created cluster, Lh+1ts . Second bit strings of
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Figure 4.14: A sample case for cluster combination with encryption operations
clusters, ‘0010’ and ‘0100’, are identical. Therefore, second bit string of new cluster
is also ‘0100’. By using the same method, third bit string is found as ‘1000’.
4.2.3 Multicasting and Energy Gain
Main aim of k-Anonymity solutions is providing the required privacy level with min-
imum information loss. However another factor, minimization of energy consump-
tion, is an important criteria in WSNs. A sensor node consumes energy for different
processes like event sensing, CPU processing, or transmitting/receiving data pack-
ets. Among these processes, transmission/reception operations consumes much of
the energy. Table 4.1 shows energy consumption rates for transmission/reception
which are published in technical report written by Carman et al. [55]. It is stated
that energy consumption ratio of transmission/reception to energy consumption of
encryption is 2333.34. Since each sensor node acts as a router for the messages of
other nodes and one message goes over many hops in the network, energy saving for
transmission/reception operations becomes a crucial design criterion. Shortening
the length of messages and decreasing the number of travelled hops would help to
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Figure 4.15: Routes when multiple k-anonymized outputs are generated
reduce energy enormously.
In a WSN topology where there are multiple sinks and each sink has differ-
ent privacy criteria, the basic solution of anonymization is that group head sensor
anonymizes the data, produces different outputs for each requirement of sink and
sends each output to related sink in different paths as shown in Figure 4.15 (in this
figure, there are two sinks in WSN). This sending method is called as multipath.
However, Ik-ACM produces unique output which is ready for multicasting. One
anonymized output that guarantees all the privacy requirements, is sent to a multi-
cast point. After reaching to multicast point, one copy of data is sent to sink1 and
the other copy is sent to sink2 as presented in Figure 4.16. Multicasting schema
decreases the number of travelled hops for some group head nodes.
Assume that there are two sinks named Sink1, Sink2. Sink1 requires k1-
anonymized data and Sink2 requires k2-anonymized data. The lengths of anonymized
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Figure 4.16: Routes when IKA anonymized output is multicasted to sinks
outputs are lk1 and lk2, which are obtained by applying directly k-ACM for k1-
anonymization and k2-anonymization, respectively. Data length of anonymous data
generated by Ik-ACM is labelled as lIKA. The number of hops in the shortest route
from group head sensor, G, to Sink1 and Sink2 is represented as hG,Sink1, hG,Sink2
respectively. Also assume that the hop distance between G and multicast point, M ,
is hG,M , distances from M to Sink1 and Sink2 are hM,Sink1 and hM,Sink2, respec-
tively. Unique anonymized data is sent to, M , if an appropriate node exists in the
network which holds the Inequality 4.12. Among the possible node candidates, the
one which minimizes the value of hG,M + hM,Sink1 + hM,Sink2 is chosen.
(hG,Sink1.lk1) + (hG,Sink2.lk2) > (hG,M + hM,Sink1 + hM,Sink2).lIKA. (4.12)
If there is no appropriate M point, group head nodes prepare output for each
sink and send them in different paths to sinks. Location of sinks and location of
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group head sensor effect the selection among multicasting and multipathing.
Inequality 4.12 determines the level of energy consumption of multicasting and
multipathing methods since it includes number of hops and the length of messages.
It is assumed that the location of sinks are known by group head nodes and they are
able to calculate the above inequalities with the routing information they have. Also
they form the outputs for multicasting and multipathing, calculate the lengths of
outputs, determine and use the best one in terms of energy saving. The first step of
Ik-ACM is actually uses k-ACM for k1-anonymization. Therefore, extra processing
load for calculating the inequality is second k2-anonymization step of IkACM for
nodes which use multipathing. Nodes in which Multicasting is more appropriate do
extra processing for k2-anonymization with k-ACM. Since, energy consumption of
WSN is mostly determined by message lengths, these extra works do not effect the
overall consumption.
4.2.4 Performance Evaluation of Ik-ACM
In this part, information loss and energy gain trade-off is deeply investigated. Since
effectiveness of multicasting depends on the locations of sinks and distribution of
sensor nodes, different experiments with different WSN topologies are performed.
First experiment investigates the effect of sink locations. The size of WSN field
is set to 500m × 500m. Distance of each hop, R, is taken as 10m. There are two
sinks in the field, sink1 and sink2. It is assumed that each sensor is uniformly
distributed through the region. In every region having size of 50m × 50m, there is
one group head sensor node. All the sensors convey their readings to their group
head nodes. Then, they anonymize data and relays it to the sinks. Each group head
node calculates the cost of multipathing and multicasting for a given set of data,
chooses the best method for data sending.
The number of hops from sensor node to group head node and from group head
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node to sinks are calculated and they are taken into consideration in calculation
of energy consumption. Energy consumption does not only depend on the number
of hops; length of the messages are also important for the final results. Message
lengths are taken into account during energy calculations.
Assume that energy consumption of method named as “multipath method” is
denoted as Emultipath. Energy consumption of method that uses multicasting when
appropriate is represented as Ehybrid. Energy gain ratio, EG, is computed as follows:
EG = 1− Ehybrid
Emultipath
. (4.13)
Values of k1, k2 are chosen as 3 and 6 respectively. If all group head nodes use
multipath method, information loss for the data sent to sink1 is found as 0.44 and
data loss for sink2 is 0.88. If multicasting with Ik-ACM is used when appropriate,
information loss for sink1 also does not change since the first step of Ik-ACM is
a normal k1-anonymization step. However, information loss of sink2 and energy
gain ratios change. Table 4.5 gives the results obtained for different sink locations.
Five different locations as given in the first column are chosen. Second column
presents information loss for sink2. The number of nodes using multicasting and
multipathing methods are shown in third and fourth columns. Last column gives
the result of energy gain according to the case when all nodes are using multipathing
method.
As the sinks get closer to each other, it is observed that the number of group head
nodes using multicasting increase due to finding optimum multicast points. In the
case where the sinks are located in coordinates of (0,0) and (500,500), sinks have the
maximum distance between each other. 716 group head nodes, out of 2500 nodes,
choose multicasting as the best alternative. Information loss increases to 1.03 bits
but energy gain is very limited, 3%. In this topology, the number of multicasting
nodes is lower and energy consumptions of multicasting and multipathing methods
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Table 4.5: Results of using Multicasting and Multipathing together with different sink
locations
Location of Sinks Info. Loss No. of Group No. of Group EG
(coordinates) For Sink2 Head Nodes Head Nodes (%)
(bits) Using Using
Value Range: Multicasting Multipathing
[0.0 2.0] Method Method
(0,0),(500,500) 1.03 716 1784 3
(0,0),(500,0) 1.14 1287 1213 6
(100,0),(400,0) 1.24 1813 687 14
(150,0),(350,0) 1.31 2137 363 22
(200,0),(300,0) 1.36 2406 94 32
do not differ. If sinks are located in coordinates (200,0) and (300,0), 2406 nodes
choose multicasting. In this case, energy gain increases to 32% and information
loss increases to 1.36. Actually, there is a trade-off between data utility and energy
consumption. If there is a need for energy minimization and sink2 can tolerate
additional data losses, using multicasting method in some network topologies may
be an efficient solution.
Other than the location of sinks, another parameter that may effect the effi-
ciency of multicasting method is the total size of WSN field. Figure 4.17 shows
the overall performance results of WSN fields having different sizes and different
sink locations. As the size of sensor field increases, multicasting method makes the
network consume less energy. For example, when the sink coordinates are (0,0) and
(0,500), energy gain is 0.22 for WSN size, 500m×500m, however gain rises to 0.35
for mode wider size, 1000m×1000m. Since, the distance between each sink is not
different in both situations, ratio of group head nodes which choose multicasting
increases in wider WSN fields. In field size 500m×500m, 1287 of 2500 group head
nodes choose multicasting. On the other side, in field having sizes 1000m×1000m,
8787 of 10000 group head nodes select multicasting option. The cost of increasing
the energy gain is the lower data utility since information loss increases to 1.32 from
1.14 in 1000m×1000m sized field. In experiments having sink locations like (0,0),
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Figure 4.17: Performance Comparison of Topologies with Different WSN area sizes
(0,500) and (0,0), (500,500), energy gains are nearly 3-6% in 500m×500m sized fields
which seem that multicasting does not create any promising results. However, in
wider sized area like 1000m×1000m, multicasting method yields good results so that
energy gain is above than 20%,
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Chapter 5
l-Diversity based Framework for Preserving Organizational
Privacy in Intrusion Log Sharing Applications
It is known that black-hat hackers share information with each others to choose and
attack victims. In underground communities, zero day vulnerability information,
target victim information, stolen credit card numbers, bots, spam mail lists, attack
tools, etc. are shared or sold easily. On the other hand, system managers, who try
to defend their systems against black-hat hackers, need to share related materials
about defensive tools, methods and information. In this defensive context, one of
the important source of information is logs of intrusion detection systems. Defensive
experience of an organization can be easily transferred to others by sharing these
logs.
It is common that most of the organizations somehow use intrusion detection sys-
tems to detect attacks to their systems. These systems do not always produce useful
outputs. Especially the elimination of false positive alarms needs a labor intensive
work. An information security expert has to choose correct set of attack signatures
which are appropriate for his system and eliminate false positive alarms. However,
most of the organizations cannot reserve man power for this task due to lack of
specialized technical person or due to lack of budget. Under these circumstances,
outsourcing of intrusion log analysis could be a good alternative.
Nowadays, National Computer Emergency Response Teams (NCERT) are try-
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ing to find ways for performing proactive nationwide or sectorwide security coun-
termeasures in order to detect and prevent cyber attacks to the national critical
information infrastructures. These infrastructures generally belong to different or-
ganizations. NCERTs try to find ways to probe them centrally. Probing aims to
deduce the overall threat state of each organization and determine the overall threat
level of country. For this aim, a distributed intrusion detection system has to be
setup and managed. Moreover, collected intrusion logs has to be centrally stored
and analyzed.
In both cases, outsourcing of intrusion log analysis of an organization or probing
of critical information infrastructures by NCERTs, there is a need to a central
intrusion log management office (CILMO) which stores logs of different organizations
centrally, analyzes them, detects attacks, send alarms to organizations and generates
statistics for determination of organizationwide or nationwide threat levels.
Main obstacle for forming a CILMO is privacy concerns of organizations. Intru-
sion logs contain valuable information about organizations, like detailed knowledge
of targeted information assets, attack times, types of attacks, results of attacks,
etc. Organizations are reluctant to share intrusion logs because of two main rea-
sons. First one is that they do not fully trust the personnel of CILMO, because
administrators of CILMO may intentionally misuse their attack information. The
second reason may be the lack of appropriate security and privacy countermeasures
which have to be applied to the intrusion logs during their transmittion, processing
and storage. Without solving these security and privacy problems, organizations
generally do not want to send their intrusion logs to a CILMO although it may be
set up by a NCERT team.
Organizations confront with a dilemma between privacy risks and benefits of
sharing intrusion logs. Actually, privacy problem can be solved by hiding private
parts of information. In a practical solution, hiding and sharing, which is contra-
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dictory in nature to each other, have to be performed at the same time. As the
privacy criterion of an organization increases, information loss of sharing operation
increases at the same time. Therefore the solution of this problem has to deal with
the trade-off between privacy and information loss and this trade-off have to be
adjusted according to the needs of organizations.
In this chapter, a privacy preserving framework is presented for intrusion log
sharing. This framework is based on l-diversity notion. This notion guarantees
that anyone cannot identify the exact sensitive attribute value of an individual
among other l − 1 sensitive attribute values. In our case, sensitive attribute is
classification type of an intrusion log. Therefore, l-diversity provides the privacy
of intrusion logs shared with CILMO so that any administrator cannot identify
the exact classification type of an intrusion belonging to information assets of a
specific organization among l − 1 different sensitive attribute values. Also privacy
schema enables us to hide the originator organization of intrusion log among l − 1
organizations.
By collection of privacy preserved intrusion logs, this framework enables CILMOs
to perform detailed security analysis of organizations, draw conclusion about the
general security status of organization categories and prepare a warning mechanism.
5.1 Threat and Network Model
In our study, organizations send their intrusion logs to a trusted party. In a realistic
scenario, trusted party may be an internet service provider (ISP) or a proxy applica-
tion, which is served by people trusted by organizations. A sample system topology
for proposed privacy framework is given in Figure 5.1. Trusted party anonymizes
intrusion logs, strips off the destination IP information of log and appends a desti-
nation tag instead of destination IP that represents only the originator organization.
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Figure 5.1: System Topology For Privacy Framework
Attributes of intrusion log are classified as shown in Table 5.1. According to this
attribute classification, our anonymization method provides prevention of record
and attribute disclosure. Therefore, it is needed to provide l -diversity property of
intrusion logs.
It is assumed that in each log coming from organizations, pre-exploitation, ex-
ploitation and post-exploitation activities are correlated and one log entry is created
for each attack. If one attack targets many servers of an organization, only one log
entry is produced by IDS. According to these assumptions nobody can bypass the
anonymization schema.
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Table 5.1: Classification of Intrusion Log Attributes
Attribute Classification
Target Organization Identifier
Target Service Quasi-identifier
Source Quasi-identifier
DetectTime Quasi-identifier
Classification Sensitive
5.2 l-ACM for Intrusion Logs
k-ACM method proposed in Chapter 3 is modified for anonymization of intrusion
logs in order to have l -diversity property. Proposed method is named as l -Diversity
Anonymous Clustering Method (l -ACM).
The stopping criteria for clustering iterations is the major modification issue.
k-ACM continues to clustering iterations until all cluster has at least k records.
However, l -ACM keeps on iterations up to the point where each cluster contains a
record set having distinct l sensitive attribute values.
Numerical attributes are converted to categorical attributes by dividing numeric
range of attribute into intervals and representing each interval by a categorical
attribute value in k-ACM.
Destination port, source IP and time attributes are also numerical attributes.
Converting them to numeric intervals does not yield valuable information for security
analysis tasks performed at CILMO side. Exact destination ports or source IP
addresses are needed in order to have statistics of port usage or to list the IP
addresses of top attackers, respectively. Also exact time information may be used for
better security analysis. Since minimization of energy consumption and shortening
anonymous output is not a requirement in an intrusion log sharing application, l -
ACM does not convert numerical attributes to intervals and it does not represent
attributes as bit string. It sends them to CILMO as a set of numerical attribute
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values. By using this method, l -ACM does not change the original data. It only
disturbs the mappings between different attributes which actually belong to the
same record.
Target organization can be considered as identifier of an intrusion log. Normally,
privacy preserved data publishing techniques strips off identification information and
anonymizes the quasi-identifiers. However, in our case, CILMO needs the names of
the target organizations in order to perform the required security analysis tasks.
Names of the target organizations are transferred to CILMO in such a way that
nobody can deduce the name of exact organization of an intrusion log among l − 1
organizations.
The same organization may send many intrusion logs to CILMO. If one anonymity
set produced by l -ACM has many intrusion logs of the same organization, this situa-
tion may violate l -diversity property. Therefore, l -ACM guarantees that each record
in each cluster has to belong different organization.
Suppose that, ith cluster gathered at the end of l -ACM has a representative
vector, Ri which is actually the anonymous output vector of all quasi-identifier
attributes. If the number of quasi-identifier attributes is assumed to be p, vector Ri
has the size value of p. Since each quasi-identifier attribute is converted to a set of
attribute values, each item consists a set of attribute values.
Suppose that n is the number of records. Set of all target organizations is
represented as {O1, O2, ..., On}. Assume that all records has m different sensitive
attribute values where m > l and these attributes values are {S1, S2, ..., Sm}. The
data sent to CILMO can be shown as {O1, O2...On}, Ri, {S1, S2...Sm}.
A running example of l -ACM is shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. Assume
that trusted party knows the IP range of each organization and each destination
IP belongs to a different organization. Destination IP of intrusion log is replaced
with the name of organization during anonymization. Trusted party gathers the
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Table 5.2: An Example About Anonymization of Intrusion Logs - Original Data
Dst IP Src IP Time Dst Srv Classification
201.2.1.10 195.100.4.4 11:00 53 DNS Zone Transfer
223.23.5.4 195.100.4.4 11:30 8080 WEB IIS ISAPI
212.125.12.12 198.166.3.3 11:40 3372 DoS MSDTC
222.19.1.103 190.67.30.3 11:45 1543 NETBIOS SMB
208.234.3.105 199.201.45.56 11:55 80 WEB-COLDFUSION
200.188.5.17 191.34.32.1 12:05 1548 DOS IGMP
Table 5.3: An Example About Anonymization of Intrusion Logs - 2-Diverse Data
Destination Source IP Time Destination Classification
Organization Service
{O1, O2} {195.100.4.4} {11:00,11:30} {8080, 53} {DNS Zone Transfer, WEB IIS ISAPI}
{O3, O4} {198.166.3.3, 190.67.30.3} {11:40, 11:45} {1543, 3372} {DoS MSDTC, NETBIOS SMB}
{O5, O6} {199.201.45.56, 191.34.32.1} {11:55, 12:05} {80, 1548} {WEB-COLDFUSION, DOS IGMP}
original data shown in Table 5.2, produces three clusters each having two elements
and makes the data 2-diverse. Each row in this table represents one cluster. All the
attributes are converted to sets of distinct attribute values. l -ACM guarantees that
in destination organization attribute, two distinct organization names exist and
classification attribute consists of a set having two different classification values.
Since source IP, time and destination port attributes are chosen quasi-identifiers,
l -ACM tries to minimize the number of distinct attribute values of these attributes
in anonymized output.
5.3 Warning Mechanism
CILMO may need to warn organizations about a very critical intrusion. Generally,
organizations set up intrusion detection systems (IDS) for monitoring of intrusions.
However, due to lack of appropriate technical expertise on evaluating IDS logs, these
systems are not used properly. CILMO can help organizations by providing technical
expertise in analyzing intrusion logs centrally.
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On the other side, if the proposed anonymization method is used in intrusion log
sharing, CILMO does not know the exact intrusion classification for exact originator.
It only knows that a set of organization corresponds to a set of intrusion classification
values. CILMO may be interested in one intrusion classification among these values.
If it is assumed that trusted party does not store any information including the
mappings of original data with anonymous data, the warning can be performed by
only distributing it to each IDS management server of all candidate organizations.
IDS management server stores all the IDS logs of corresponding organization in a
database.
Details of warning mechanism is described with an example in Figure 5.2. Each
organization sends their logs which are labelled as r1, r2, ..., r6 to trusted party (TP),
in step 1. TP anonymizes the data according to 2-diversity criteria and sends the
anonymous outputs a1, a2, a3 to CILMO in step 2. Assume that CILMO decided to
warn the organizations about the DNS Zone Transfer attack because of its critical-
ity. CILMO chooses the record among the anonymous records which has this attack
type in the set of classification attributes. CILMO creates w1 from a1 by stripping
off all organization attributes and all classification information except “DNS Zone
Transfer” and sends w1 to IDS management servers of organization 1 (O1) and or-
ganization 2 (O2) in steps 3 and 4. In step 5, O1 and O2 query whether an intrusion
log exist about the profile given in w1 and deduce that whether the corresponding
warning is related with their organization.
A drawback of this mechanism is that the organization O2, which decides the
warning does not belong to itself in the above example, also gets the profile infor-
mation of intrusion occurred for O1. O2 learns that a DNS Zone Transfer attack is
performed at 11:00 by 194.100.4.4 to an organization; but it cannot learn that the
targeted organization is O1.
If trusted party is allowed to store mapping information between original data
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Figure 5.2: Warning Mechanism with the requirement that trusted party does not store
any information
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Figure 5.3: Warning Mechanism with the requirement that trusted party can store infor-
mation
and anonymous output, after deciding the warning message, CILMO sends w1 to
TP. TP finds the exact matching record r1 with the DNS Zone Transfer attack and
relays r1 to O1 as shown in Figure 5.3. In this method, an organization does not
learn anything about the intrusion logs of other organizations.
5.4 Performance Evaluation of l-ACM
In this part, the performance of l -ACM is evaluated in terms of information loss and
average response time of intrusion log records. Average response time, Tavg shows
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the average of the amount of times between generation of log at owner organization
and arriving corresponding warning to that organization from CILMO.
In our experiments, each organization generates intrusion log in a such a way
that all attributes of logs are formed using uniform distribution. The log generation
time for ith log record is represented as tig. Log generation rate, lgr, which is the
number of produced logs per minute, is a predetermined parameter that adjusts the
speed of log generation. It is assumed that each organization uses the same log
generation rate. All log records generated in one minute is collected at organization
site and they are sent to CILMO at the end of that minute. Therefore, ith log record
waits 60− tig seconds at organization site before sending to CILMO.
After CILMO receives logs, anonymization operations take place by using l -
ACM. Anonymization is completed in several steps. In each step, data set which
includes only one record from each organization is chosen among the received logs
and they are anonymized. Otherwise, if we include more than one record from each
organization, an anonymity set may contain more than one record belonging to same
organization which violates l -diversity property. Restriction of one record from the
same organization actually means that number of steps needed for completion of
anonymization is numerically equal to log generation rate. The duration of mth
anonymization step is represented as tma
In l -ACM, we use a record selection method for preparing input data of each
anonymization step. Our method chooses an initial record from the first organiza-
tion. For each other organization, logs of an organization are compared with the
record of first organization and the one having most similarity is chosen as an input
record in that step.
Anonymized outputs are analyzed by CILMO. If analysis results require to send a
warning to appropriate organization, warnings are sent by using one of the methods
given in Section 5.3. In performance calculations, parameter called log analysis time,
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tl, is used for log analysis of one log record at CILMO. Warnings are sent after this
analysis time has passed.
Transmission time needed for transferring one log record from organization to
CILMO and time for transferring one warning to organization is represented as tr.
In average response time calculations, we assume that for each log record, CILMO
sends a warning message.
Average response time for a log record is calculated as given in Equation 5.1.
We assume that total number of input record is n.
Tavg = (60− tig) +
s=m∑
s=1
tma + tl + 2.tr. (5.1)
The effects of changes in parameter l and lgr with respect to information loss and
response time performances of l -ACM are investigated via simulations. Experiments
are performed in a laptop having 1.20 GHz CPU and 2GB RAM. Intrusion data is
synthetically generated. A java implementation is developed for data generation,
application of l -ACM and evaluating the results.
k -ACM calculates the information loss according to Equation 3.5. In this for-
mula, Fij is the total number of bits having value ‘1’ for the i
th record of jth attribute.
On the other side, l -ACM produces anonymized output with attribute value sets
instead of bit strings. Therefore, l -ACM uses the size of attribute value set (which
means the number of distinct elements in the set) instead of Fij.
There are 100 distinct attackers in the network. The number of distinct values
for intrusion classification is 15 and the number of slots for time value is 100. There
are distinct 10 destination service in the data set. According to these parameters,
maximum information loss is calculated as 5.54 via the help of Equation 3.5. If
anonymized outputs contain data entries consisting of all possible data values, it
has the maximum information loss. For example, including all distinct attackers in
the output generates an information loss of log (100). Overall information loss is
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Figure 5.4: Effects of lgr and l on Information Loss
actually the average of maximum information loss caused by each attribute.
Effects of lgr and l values on information loss results is given in Figure 5.4. In
these experiments, number of organizations which send their logs to CILMO is fixed
to 500. As shown in Figure 5.4, increase in lgr does not effect information loss
values for each l value.
Effects of lgr and l values on average response time are given in Figure 5.5. In
this experiment, number of organizations is also fixed to 500. It is observed that
average response time increases as lgr increases for each l values. There is a linear
relationship between average response time and lgr values. Since lgr also determines
the number of anonymization steps performed at CILMO, increase in the number
of steps increases the time for anonymization operations. For the same lgr, we get
higher average response time values for higher l values due to need for much more
processing in hierarchical clusterings.
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Figure 5.5: Effects of lgr and l on Average Response Time
Effects of the changes in number of organizations are analyzed. Figure 5.6 shows
the effects of organization number to information loss. Figure 5.7 analyzes average
response time results of l-ACM with different number of organizations. In these
experiments, l and lgr values are fixed to 5 and 8 respectively.
From Figure 5.6, it is deduced that information loss value exponentially decreases
as the number of organization increases. Since anonymization is performed among
bigger sets of log records in higher organization numbers, l -ACM has the possibility
to find more similar records during hierarchical clustering.
Figure 5.7 shows that higher number of organizations causes higher response
times. There exists an exponential increase in response times. Increase in organiza-
tion number means in each anonymization step, higher number records are given as
an input to l-ACM. Running time of k-ACM is given as O(n2logn) in 3.8 of Chapter
3. Here n represents the number of input records inserted to k-ACM. Since l-ACM
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bases on k-ACM, an exponential increase in the average response time is expected
as shown in Figure 5.7.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Network and database communities approach to privacy problem from different
aspects. In one side, network community mostly thinks that hiding sender and/or
receiver in network communications is the prominent privacy problem. Privacy
threat models presented by this community are based on concealing communication
profiles against traffic analysis attacks. These attacks focus on external threats like
global or local eavesdropping. On the other side, database community uses “data”
per se as the subject of privacy. They bring solutions for privacy preserved storage
and sharing of data. However, privacy models are not suitable for the actual needs
of network applications, where data is gathered from users and relayed to data
collectors. There are some models that fully trust data collection parties which are
not very realistic in most of the cases. There are some other models that consider
data collector as an un-trusted entity. However, in such models, privacy preservation
is provided by sending perturbed data to the data collector, which limits the types
of analysis that can be performed by data collector.
In general, privacy models developed by database community do not map to
user-centric network applications. Network community deals with sender-receiver
anonymity, which may not be the real threat in most of data collection applications.
In this thesis, we propose a privacy preservation framework for user centric data
collection applications. Our framework encompasses all stages of data collection,
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including collection of data from users and sending to the data collection points. It
proposes solutions for applications that may have more than one data collector points
with different level of privacy requirements. Proposed framework brings solutions
for possible requirements of bandwidth limitation and energy consumption.
We proposed a method, k-ACM (k-Anonymization Clustering Method) which
makes data k-anonymized. k -ACM is based on UPGMA (Unweighted Pair Group
Method with Arithmetic Mean), a well-known bottom-up hierarchical clustering
mechanism. Conditional entropy notion of information theory is adapted to be
used as the distance function, which calculates the information loss during each
clustering process. The same notion is also used for calculating the anonymity level
of k-anonymized data and for evaluating the results of experiments in terms of
information loss. Additionally, this thesis introduces dynamic taxonomy tree idea
for the generalization operation in order to decrease the data utility of collected
data.
Our framework is applied for two types of data collection applications: (i) privacy
preserved data collection in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), (ii) preservation of
organizational privacy during collection of intrusion detection logs from different
organizations.
Minimization of energy is an important criteria in WSNs. Therefore, privacy
preserved data collection applications in these networks also has to deal with this
issue. Proposed framework is adapted for energy minimization. Our framework is
applied to two different WSN network models. First model preserves privacy against
semi-trusted sink and eavesdropper. Second model consists of multiple sinks which
require different levels of privacy.
First network model implies two levels of k-anonymity: 1) against the semi-
trusted sink; 2) against eavesdroppers. This network model assumes the sink as a
semi-trusted entity, so that data received by sink must be at least k1-anonymous.
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To protect the data against eavesdroppers, data transmitted in the network must be
at least k2-anonymous. Since the minimum protection against eavesdroppers must
be greater than the minimum protection against the semi-trusted sink, k2 is greater
than k1. WSN designers can decide on the values of k1 and k2 by considering the
security threats of environment and application requirements. For example, if the
possibility of eavesdropper threat is high and security of sink is provided, then the
WSN designers can choose higher k2 and lower k1 values.
There is a tradeoff between data quality (in terms of information loss) received
at the sink and energy consumption. Quality of data reduces with generalizations
since data is irreversibly perturbed via generalizations and this causes information
loss.
The mechanism that we use in this model is Proposed method, mk -ACM (Modi-
fied k -Anonymization Clustering Method) which uses the idea of k -ACM iteratively
two times. It firstly makes the data k1-anonymous by generalization operations and
continues to k2-anonymization by generalization and encryption operations. The
output size of k2-anonymization stage can be adjusted by a pre-determined thresh-
old value, output enlargement factor. As this ratio increases, the size of output gets
larger and more encryption operations are performed. During this enlargement, mk-
ACM selects the most suitable data portions for encryption in order to minimize the
information loss as much as possible. Increase of output enlargement factor causes
an increase in the energy consumption in the WSN. On the other hand, the quality
of data received at the sink becomes higher since data is not perturbed widely. If
the ratio decreases, quality of data becomes lower but the system consumes consid-
erably small amount of energy. In fact, mk-ACM provides a mechanism for WSN
designers to balance between information loss and energy cost by using the output
enlargement factor. Our analyses show that energy saving per information loss value
constantly increases as the output enlargement factor increases. This implies that
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WSN designers should pick the maximum output enlargement factor that informa-
tion loss and/or energy saving restrictions of the WSN dictate. For example, our
analysis shows that given the sink is to receive 4-anonymous data (i.e. k1 = 4)
and 12-anonymous data is required against eavesdroppers (i.e. k2 = 12), and if the
network can tolerate an information loss of entropy value, 0.37, then WSN design-
ers can pick output enlargement factor as 0.4 that causes to save 43% energy while
providing the required anonymity levels.
The second network model considered in WSNs states that there exists multiple
sinks and each sink has different level of privacy requirements. For this model, we
propose a method called Ik -ACM (Iterative k-Anonymization Clustering Method)
which is also built-on our k-ACM method. Proposed Ik-ACM reduces energy con-
sumption while fulfilling the required different privacy levels of sinks. Ik-ACM
Method uses encryption operations with generalization operations in order to have
one common anonymized output. This common output enables us to multicast
the same message to all sinks. Multicasting of this output enables WSN to reduce
amount of energy consumed for transmitting it to the sinks. In WSN, each local
region has one group head node. They gather event data from sensors of their local
region, anonymize it and send it to the all sinks. According to the positions of group
head nodes and their distances to sinks, multicasting can be better alternative for
some of the group head nodes. Each group head node decides whether multicast-
ing is appropriate for itself or not. If it decreases energy consumption, group head
node uses it. Multicasting method degrades the quality of data gathered by some
sinks. Here, there is a trade-off between data loss and energy consumption. WSN
designers has to decide about the trade-off between energy saving and information
loss. We analyze this trade-off for different sized WSN topologies and for different
sink locations. Our analyses show that, in a WSN having two sinks, it is possible
to save 32% of energy however the loss of data utility received by one of the sink
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increases to 1.36 from 0.88 in some topologies.
In the scope of this thesis, we also apply the proposed framework for an appli-
cation in which intrusion logs are collected from different organizations by a central
intrusion log management office. This office is tasked for determination of overall
security posture of whole organization ecosystem, designation of security status of
monitored organizations, and give feedbacks or warnings about critical intrusions
to organizations. Privacy threat model states that the collected log has to have
l -diversity property. This means, any administrator of central office cannot deduce
the exact classification type of intrusion log among l classification types. A modified
version of k -ACM, l -ACM (l-Diversity Anonymous Clustering Method), is proposed
for this purpose. Different warning mechanisms are presented according to the se-
curity requirement whether trusted parties are allowed to temporarily store network
traffic.
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